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Reforming Competence Restoration Statutes: An 
Outpatient Model 
SUSAN MCMAHON* 
Defendants found incompetent to stand trial are often committed to an 
inpatient mental health facility to restore their competence, even if out-
patient care may be the better treatment option. This inpatient-default 
model has two serious negative effects: (1) defendants found incompetent 
spend far longer confined before trial than their similarly situated com-
petent counterparts, and (2) because of long wait periods for hospital 
beds, defendants found incompetent spend large chunks of their time con-
fined in a jail cell, which is possibly the worst place for a person with a 
mental health condition to be housed. 
This Article is the first to examine how the language of compe-
tence restoration statutes defaults to inpatient treatment, even when 
the statute appears to allow for outpatient care. Some statutes man-
date inpatient care. Others impose additional, irrelevant hurdles to 
the release of defendants found incompetent, or give courts unbridled 
discretion to place defendants in inpatient care, or both. When paired 
with widespread false presumptions about individuals living with 
mental illness, the implicit—or sometimes explicit—inpatient default 
found in most competence restoration statutes leads courts to over-
commit defendants to state mental health facilities. 
This Article proposes amendments to the statutory language that 
will require judges to place defendants in outpatient care, unless spe-
cific criteria justify inpatient treatment. Such a change would accom-
plish two goals. First, it would eliminate the needless disparity in 
pretrial confinement between defendants found incompetent and those 
found competent. Although the rates of pretrial confinement will almost 
certainly remain higher among defendants found incompetent, that con-
finement would be based on criteria related to the defendant’s treat-
ment need, not biased concerns about the defendant’s perceived 
dangerousness. Second, an outpatient-default model would relieve 
pressure on inpatient facilities, opening up space for those who truly 
need inpatient treatment to restore competence. When the competence 
restoration backlog is alleviated, defendants who need inpatient care 
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will be transferred to hospitals immediately, rather than waiting for 
months in a jail cell until a bed opens up.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Police arrested Jamycheal Mitchell for stealing five dollars’ worth of snacks at 
a 7-Eleven.1 A judge found him incompetent to stand trial and ordered him sent 
to a state mental health facility to restore his competence.2 Four months later, he 
died in his jail cell, forty pounds lighter than he was when arrested, after prison 
officials allegedly denied him food, turned off the water to his cell, and failed to 
provide him with medications to treat his mental illness.3 Mitchell was never 
admitted to the mental health facility.4 
A Texas judge found Isaac Lemelle incompetent in March 2016.5 Almost six 
months later, he was still waiting for a transfer to a mental health facility.6 A class 
action lawsuit filed in Texas alleged that 346 other defendants were in similar 
straits: confined to a jail or prison, but waiting for space to open at an inpatient fa-
cility.7 For most of his six-month wait, Lemelle was confined to the jail’s psychi-
atric lockdown unit, where he was allowed out of his cell for only one hour per 
day and had no guaranteed time outdoors.8 
After John Sherman was found incompetent to stand trial, the examining psy-
chiatrist recommended outpatient treatment, which the court and the prosecutor 
agreed was “best for all concerned.”9 If institutionalized, Sherman risked perma-
nent harm.10 Regardless, believing itself bound by the language of the statute gov-
erning competence restoration, the court committed Sherman to the custody of 
the Attorney General, who was required to hospitalize the defendant.11 
These stories are not uncommon. Defendants who live with mental illness and 
are found incompetent to stand trial are often ordered committed to an inpatient 
mental health facility to restore their competence, even if outpatient care may be 
the better treatment option. Rather than receive treatment in the community, 
defendants are usually sent to a state psychiatric hospital and confined throughout  
1. Complaint at 5, Adams v. Naphcare, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (E.D. Va. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv- 
229), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2018). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 6–7. 
4. Id. at 5. 
5. Third Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 5, Ward ex rel. Bourliot v. 
Hellerstedt, No. 1:16-cv-00917 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017). 
6. Id. at 6. 
7. Id. at 9–10. 
8. Id. at 23. 
9. United States v. Sherman, 722 F. Supp. 504, 505 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 505–06 (noting that the court had no power to order placement of defendant, but 
recommending that the Attorney General consider “hospitalize in a suitable facility” to mean giving the 
defendant the treatment he needed to become competent). 
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their treatment.12 Not only are they confined during their care, but they also spend 
long periods of time in jail as they wait for a hospital bed to become available.13 
These individuals have not been convicted of a crime, yet they spend weeks or 
months under state control—in either jail or a psychiatric institution—before 
their trial can even begin. 
This default to inpatient care is problematic on two fronts. First, defendants 
found incompetent to stand trial spend much more time in pretrial detention than 
competent defendants accused of the same offense.14 This is true even if the 
defendants have the same charge severity and pose the same risk of re-arrest if 
released before trial.15 Second, defendants spend much of that confinement in 
their jail cell (waiting for an inpatient bed to open up), even though individuals 
living with a mental health condition are particularly unsuited for the jail environ-
ment. Such defendants are placed in solitary confinement at higher rates, experi-
ence neglect and abuse from fellow prisoners and guards, and descend further 
into mental illness when confined without treatment.16 As criminal justice sys-
tems move toward reforming pretrial detention—in part because of the recogni-
tion that it causes deep harm to individuals, families, and communities17
See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 3 (2017), https:// 
university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=f9d452f6- 
ac5a-b8e7-5d68-0969abd2cc82&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/YRD7-DEKU] (“The past five years 
have witnessed a remarkable growth in support for reforming our nation’s pretrial justice system . . . . 
This unprecedented interest emerges from a growing awareness that existing pretrial operations lead to 
unnecessary detention of poor and working class people—disproportionately people of color—while 
those with money are able to go free with little or no supervision, regardless of any danger they may 
present.”). 
—the 
individuals living with mental illness who are most harmed by those conditions 
remain stuck in limbo between a jail cell and a hospital bed. 
Outpatient competence restoration programs promise to relieve this pres-
sure. A handful of jurisdictions have experimented with outpatient programs 
for small numbers of defendants.18 Those efforts have been mostly successful, 
12. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 933 
(1985) (“Of those defendants found incompetent, the overwhelming majority are committed to state 
hospitals for treatment.”). 
13. See infra Part I. 
14. See infra Section I.A. 
15. Id. 
16. See infra Section I.B. 
17. 
18. 
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According to one recent report prepared for the State of Washington’s Department of Social 
and Health Services, only fifteen states (and the District of Columbia) have formal outpatient 
competence restoration programs: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Wisconsin. See 
GROUNDSWELL SERVS., INC., FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH CONSULTANT REVIEW FINAL REPORT 28 & n.6 
(2014), https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sites/default/files/BHSIA/WSH/GroundswellReport6.30.14.pdf [hereinafter 
WA REPORT]. Another recent report added two more states to this list: California and Oregon. See W. Neil 
Gowensmith et al., Lookin’ for Beds in All the Wrong Places: Outpatient Competency Restoration as a 
Promising Approach to Modern Challenges, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 299 tbl.4 (2016). Utah 
has also recently adopted an outpatient competence restoration program. See Press Release, Disability Law 
Ctr., Officials Sign Class Action Settlement Agreement to Reduce Wait Time for Those Needing Mental 
Health Services to Stand Trial (June 12, 2017), http://disabilitylawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads2/2017/ 
06/FY17-DHS-DLC-Settlement-Press-Release.pdf (“The parties agreed to continue the state’s innovative 
community-based Outreach Program, started in 2016, which treats low-risk forensic patients in the 
community to lessen the wait time for a bed at the Hospital.”). 
19. Gowensmith et al., supra note 18, at 299 (noting estimated savings per outpatient referral of 
$21,409 in Texas and $41,290 in Wisconsin). One survey estimated outpatient treatment for competence 
restoration saved about $60,000 per participant, as compared to inpatient treatment. WA REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 29. 
20. See infra Section III.B.1. 
21. See infra Section III.B.2. 
22. See infra Section II.A. 
23. See infra Section II.B. 
24. See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 375 (1992); see also infra Part II. 
25. See infra Section II.A. 
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achieving restoration rates comparable to inpatient programs at a significantly 
lower cost.19 
But even if every state suddenly opened a robust outpatient competence resto-
ration program, an obstacle looms: the statutes governing competence restoration, 
which default to the inpatient-treatment model. Several states mandate inpatient 
restoration in their statutory schemes.20 The rest allow for outpatient restoration, 
but the language of these laws often preserves the inpatient default by requiring 
defendants to meet a series of nebulous or irrelevant criteria before allowing 
them to participate in outpatient treatment.21 
Statutes without precisely focused criteria for assessing which defendants 
belong in inpatient treatment will inevitably lead to an overcommitment of indi-
viduals in hospitals because of the vast stigma surrounding mental illness. One 
deeply held myth is that people with mental illness are dangerous. Yet studies 
have shown that individuals with mental illness are no more violent than other 
individuals in similar circumstances.22 The public also believes that a hospital set-
ting is almost always the best option for treatment, yet outpatient programs have 
been successful even for individuals suffering from severe mental illness.23 One 
scholar has termed these ideas “sanist” myths—assumptions based on widespread 
misunderstandings about mental illness.24 Judges are not immune from such 
biases and may actually be more susceptible to them because they play to a trial 
judge’s worst fear: releasing a defendant before trial who then commits a violent 
crime.25 
This Article is the first to examine how the language of competence restoration 
statutes, even those that allow for outpatient treatment, defaults to commitment to 
an inpatient facility. Where these statutes do not outright mandate inpatient care, 
they give unbridled discretion to judges to hospitalize defendants. That discre-
tion, paired with widespread false presumptions about individuals living with 
mental illness, leads to overcommitment. In addition, these statutes place hurdles 
in the path of defendants found incompetent that are both more stringent than 
those that must be met by competent defendants and irrelevant to the question of 
whether inpatient treatment is necessary for competence restoration. 
I propose amendments to the statutory language that will require judges to 
place defendants in outpatient care, unless specific criteria justify inpatient 
treatment. My proposal suggests two major reforms. First, defendants found 
incompetent should be subject to the same pretrial release standards as other 
defendants. Competence restoration statutes should be stripped of additional irrel-
evant hurdles that apply only to defendants found incompetent; after all, ques-
tions of dangerousness or flight risk are already addressed by jurisdictions’ 
pretrial release statutes. Second, the one criterion that competence restoration 
statutes should assess is whether inpatient treatment is the only avenue to success-
fully restore a defendant’s competence. To effectively evaluate that question, 
statutes must default to outpatient treatment unless some specific conditions jus-
tify committing the defendant to an inpatient facility. Such a change would elimi-
nate bars to outpatient placements and relieve pressure on inpatient facilities, thus 
opening up beds for those who cannot be restored elsewhere. It would also ensure 
that specific criteria relevant to treatment—not misunderstandings or fears about 
individuals living with mental illness—inform the decision to commit the defend-
ant to inpatient care. 
I make this case in four parts. Part I overviews the competence evaluation and 
restoration process and describes how overcrowding in inpatient facilities has left 
many defendants stranded in jails before competence restoration can begin. 
Part II describes the mistaken assumptions that push judges toward inpatient 
treatment. Part III explains the law governing competence restoration, describing 
the history of the doctrine and the statutes that currently determine competence 
restoration placement. Here, I show how these statutes leave much room for san-
ist impulses to govern decisionmaking. Finally, in Part IV, I advocate for a statute 
that cabins judicial discretion and defaults to an outpatient option. 
Previous scholarship has tackled competency evaluations26 or reforming 
incompetence procedure generally.27 Yet little has been said about the role com-
petence restoration statutes have played in driving huge numbers of defendants 
toward inpatient treatment, and thus toward extended jail detention. This Article 
begins to fill that gap by identifying those laws as a reason for the competence 
restoration backlog and proposing amendments to ease the flood of defendants 
referred for inpatient competence restoration.28 
26. See, e.g., Gowensmith et al., supra note 18, at 293–94 (noting that the scholarship has a “robust 
focus” on competency to stand trial evaluations, but “less attention has been given to competency 
restoration”). See generally Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193 (2004) (considering the legal standards for competence to stand trial and 
finding that mental health professionals who conduct competency evaluations rarely understand those 
standards). 
27. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency 
Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 75 (1972); Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and 
Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
571, 573, 582–96 (1995) [hereinafter Winick, Reforming Incompetency]; Winick, supra note 12, at 927– 
28, 951–79. 
28. Before diving in, a word about what this Article aims to accomplish. Defendants living with 
mental disorders face a myriad of issues as they navigate the criminal justice system. For example, they 
tend to be homeless and live in poverty, which raises obstacles to pretrial release, such as an inability to 
pay bail. I recognize that my proposed amendments will not solve these difficult related issues. That 
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I. COMPETENCE RESTORATION PROCESS AND PROBLEMS 
A defendant in a criminal case—let’s call him Marty—yells at the judge and 
spits on the floor during his first appearance in court after his arrest. Marty has a 
history of schizophrenia, which first manifested as auditory hallucinations when 
he was seventeen. He is now twenty-three and homeless, and has been accused of 
criminal trespass because he set up his tent on private property for one night. 
After the outburst in court, the judge suspects that Marty might not be compe-
tent to stand trial. The judge knows the legal standard for competence—a defend-
ant must be able to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and must have both a factual and rational understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him29—but he does not yet know the scope of the issue. Plenty 
of individuals with mental health conditions have enough of a grasp on reality to 
communicate with their attorney and understand the proceedings,30 the judge 
thinks. He needs an expert to help him decide whether Marty clears the compe-
tence bar, and he orders a competency assessment.31 
The above hypothetical is typical of the first stage of the competence process, 
competency evaluation. Between 50,000 and 60,000 defendants are referred for 
competency assessments each year.32 If the defendant is found incompetent, as 
about 10,000 to 12,000 defendants are annually, then the second stage of the com-
petence process—competence restoration, the focus of this Article—begins.33 
said, even if state legislatures eliminated bail bonds and eradicated homelessness, competence 
restoration statutes would remain obstacles to placing defendants found incompetent in outpatient 
treatment. Amendment of these provisions is thus a necessary piece, but not the only piece, of any plan 
to tackle the issues facing defendants with mental health diagnoses in the criminal justice system. 
29. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
30. See, e.g., CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE 105 (2015) (indicating competency is found in eighty percent of competency assessments); 
Janet I. Warren et al., Factors Influencing 2,260 Opinions of Defendants’ Restorability to Adjudicative 
Competency, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 498, 498 (2013) (indicating about twenty to thirty percent of 
individuals assessed for competency are found incompetent). 
31. Although this hypothetical describes how the process would usually work in practice, many 
scholars have raised questions as to the appropriateness of relying on expert testimony in assessing 
competence. One study concluded that mental health professionals can be unreliable because they often 
conflate the competency assessment with clinical issues, such as whether the defendant has a serious 
mental disorder, e.g., Morris et al., supra note 26, at 237, while other scholars believe lawyers and 
judges are better at assessing competence than clinicians, e.g., Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra 
note 27, at 612 (“Competence to stand trial is fundamentally a legal question. A lawyer is better able 
than a clinical evaluator to determine whether a client possesses the skills needed to participate in a 
criminal trial.”). 
32. See, e.g., BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 30, at 105; Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice 
Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S3 (2007); Warren et al., supra note 30, at 498. 
33. Some scholars suspect that both categories of defendants, those evaluated and those found 
incompetent, have grown substantially since these estimates were calculated in 2000. E.g., Gowensmith 
et al., supra note 18, at 293 (“Moreover, the number of evaluations is growing annually. The state of 
Colorado reported a 206% increase in the number of CST evaluations from 2005 to 2014, whereas Los 
Angeles County reported a 273% increase from 2010 to 2015.” (citations omitted)); id. at 295 (“Hawaii 
saw a 35.8% increase in persons found [incompetent to stand trial] from 2005 to 2009, Wisconsin had a 
34.8% increase between 2011 and 2013, and Washington saw a 73% increase between 2010 and 2014.” 
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Here is how that process typically works: After a finding of incompetence, a 
court orders Marty sent to a state mental health facility. There, mental health pro-
fessionals will attempt to both treat his schizophrenia with antipsychotic medica-
tion and give him some tools to help him communicate with his attorney and 
understand the criminal trial.34 
The first priority is to bring Marty’s symptoms under control. Treatment for 
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia will include antipsychotic medica-
tions,35 which should begin to ease his hallucinations immediately, with further 
improvements continuing over the next six to eight weeks.36 Although the drugs 
usually do not achieve total remission of symptoms, about eighty-seven percent 
of individuals improve to the point of becoming competent to stand trial.37 
Once the medication begins working, Marty may then be placed in an educa-
tion program.38 A typical program would familiarize Marty with legal concepts 
and trial processes, such as the roles of various courtroom personnel and informa-
tion about criminal charges and pleas.39 He may take part in a mock trial, watch a 
movie depicting courtroom scenes, or hear from a defense attorney about what to 
expect in court.40 He may also learn anxiety-reducing techniques to calm himself 
during the proceeding.41 
The goal with competence restoration is not the same as if Marty were seeking 
psychiatric care as a patient. To be competent is not to be well or even symptom- 
free. One can engage in delusional thinking or hear and see things that are not 
there, and still be able to communicate with an attorney and understand the pro-
ceedings. Competence restoration success rates are therefore typically high and 
(citations omitted)); see also BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 30, at 105 (suggesting competency 
evaluations have grown steadily alongside arrest rates). 
34. See Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a 
Clinical Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 88 (2005) (noting that 
although almost all competence restoration programs relied on medication to restore the competence of 
defendants with mental illness, a significant sub-set of programs studied—eighty-eight percent—also 
used some type of didactic or psychoeducational group intervention). 
35. See id. at 89 (describing antipsychotic medication as part of “the usual treatment approach”). 
36. Robert Freedman, Schizophrenia, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1738, 1742 (2003). 
37. Brian Ladds et al., Involuntary Medication of Patients Who Are Incompetent to Stand Trial: A 
Descriptive Study of the New York Experience with Judicial Review, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
L. 529, 539 (1993) (describing the results of a study conducted between 1986 and 1990). 
38. One constant across almost all competence restoration programs is antipsychotic medication for 
those who suffer from psychotic disorders. See Pinals, supra note 34, at 88. But whether the hospital also 
has an education component and, if so, what that program looks like, varies widely from institution to 
institution. Few studies have looked to the effectiveness of these programs, but the case studies 
described in the sources mentioned in notes 34 and 36 provide some indication that medication-plus- 
education programs enjoy high rates of success in restoring defendants to competence. 
39. See Pinals, supra note 34, at 89–93; see also Stephen G. Noffsinger, Restoration to Competency 
Practice Guidelines, 45 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 356, 357 (2001) 
(discussing the need to teach defendants about legal concepts and the criminal trial process as part of 
competency restoration). 
40. Noffsinger, supra note 39, at 359–60. 
41. Id. at 361. 
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defendants are returned to court within a few months, their competence 
restored.42 
The problem is that not enough public psychiatric beds exist to accommodate 
the defendants referred for competence restoration each year. Public hospital 
facilities nationwide have only about 38,000 staffed beds, or 11.7 beds per 
100,000 people.43 According to health policy experts, 40 to 60 beds per 100,000 
people are necessary to meet the demand for inpatient care.44 
Of the 38,000 beds available, only about 17,000 are reserved for forensic 
patients, meaning patients who have come into contact with the criminal justice 
system in some way.45 Those 17,000 beds must accommodate both the defend-
ants found incompetent to stand trial every year and the longer term residents of 
mental health facilities, such as convicted offenders with a mental health condi-
tion, inmates found not guilty by reason of insanity, or sexually violent predators. 
One survey of mental health directors showed that in 2016 alone, at least 21,091 
individuals were referred for forensic services at state hospitals; that number 
includes neither the states who did not respond to the survey nor longer term resi-
dents of state mental health facilities who already occupied forensic beds.46 
See AMANDA WIK ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., FORENSIC 
PATIENTS IN STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS: 1996–2016, at 82–83 (2017), https://www.nasmhpd.org/ 
sites/default/files/TACPaper.10.Forensic-Patients-in-State-Hospitals_508C_v2.pdf. 
There 
are simply not enough inpatient beds to go around, and defendants found incom-
petent to stand trial are often put in the back of the line.47 
In California, for example, the Department of Mental Health prioritizes finding beds for 
convicted offenders, individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity, and sexually violent predators 
over defendants found incompetent to stand trial. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: TREATING THE INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 10 (2012), http://www.lao.ca. 
gov/reports/2012/hlth/ist/incompetent-stand-trial-010312.pdf. 
The result of the inpatient bed shortage is lengthy wait times for competence 
restoration services. In 2012, California’s waitlist was commonly 200 to 300 
defendants long.48 In 2010, the average wait time was 68 days, or over two 
months, with some inmates waiting as long as 162 days, or over five months.49 
One recent lawsuit in Texas revealed that an average of 306 pretrial defendants 
were waiting for a bed to open at a state psychiatric facility at any given time in 
2011.50 These detainees waited in county jail for as long as seven months before 
their transfer to a state mental hospital.51 In 2006, Florida’s waitlist stood at 310 
42. See Gowensmith et al., supra note 18, at 301 (“Nationally, inpatient lengths of stay for 
individuals who are restored to competency average around 89 days . . . .”); Warren et al., supra note 30, 
at 499 (analyzing studies finding upwards of seventy percent restoration rates and concluding that 
“incompetent defendants are overwhelmingly restored to competency”). 
43. DORIS A. FULLER ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR.: OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PUB. AFFAIRS, 
GOING, GOING, GONE: TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING STATE PSYCHIATRIC BEDS 1 
(2016). 
44. Id. at 3. 
45. Id. at 1. 
46. 
47. 
48. Id. at 9. 
49. Id. at 8–9. 
50. Lakey v. Taylor, 435 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tex. App. 2014). 
51. Id. 
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defendants.52 One Florida defendant awaiting hospital placement was held in an 
isolation cell at the jail for two months, refusing to eat meals served to him 
because he believed they were poisoned.53 The statistics in other states are 
equally dire. A survey of forty states found that thirty-one had waitlists, with av-
erage wait times of one month for criminal defendants to get hospital beds.54 
Three states had average wait times of six months to one year.55 
These lengthy wait times are troubling on at least two different fronts: 
(1) defendants found incompetent to stand trial are imprisoned for longer periods 
of time than competent defendants, and (2) defendants living with mental illness 
suffer significant harm while in jail.56 
A. DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL SPEND LONGER PERIODS 
IMPRISONED THAN COMPETENT DEFENDANTS 
A defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial and is hospitalized will of-
ten spend a longer time imprisoned than a competent defendant accused of the 
same crime with the same criminal history.57 One study of criminal defendants in 
New York City found that defendants diagnosed with a mental health condition 
ordinarily stayed in jail twice as long as defendants without mental illness, even 
though these two groups had the same charge severity and risk of re-arrest.58 
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., IMPROVING OUTCOMES FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESSES INVOLVED WITH NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURT AND CORRECTION SYSTEMS 3 (2012), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CTBNYC-Court-Jail_7-cc.pdf. 
In 
New Mexico, defendants without mental health conditions were held in detention 
facilities for an average of 141 days.59 
LINDA FREEMAN ET AL., N.M. SENTENCING COMM’N, EFFECT OF COMPETENCY AND DIAGNOSTIC 
EVALUATION ON LENGTH OF STAY IN A SAMPLE OF NEW MEXICO DETENTION FACILITIES 3 (2013), 
https://nmsc.unm.edu/reports/2013/effect-of-competency-and-diagnostic-evaluation-on-length-of-stay- 
in-a-sample-of-new-mexico-detention-facilities.pdf. 
Defendants who had competency hearings 
and were found competent were held in those facilities for 332 days.60 
Defendants found incompetent were held for 537 days, over a year longer than  
52. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Soliman, 947 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
53. Id. 
54. W. LAWRENCE FITCH, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., FORENSIC 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 30 (2014). 
55. Id. 
56. This Article focuses on only the harms defendants may suffer while detained; there are likely 
long-lasting adverse behavioral and psychological consequences as well. The theory of therapeutic 
jurisprudence suggests that policymakers and academics should also consider these often-hidden 
consequences when assessing a law. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling 
and the Implications for Mental Health Law, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 17, 17–18 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996). Bruce 
Winick has persuasively argued that even the labeling of an individual as incompetent—regardless of 
what happens to that individual after this finding—has negative psychological effects that are rarely 
considered in the justification of laws requiring competence. Id. at 19–20. 
57. See, e.g., Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 27, at 580 (“If convicted, many of these 
[misdemeanor] defendants would pay a small fine or receive a period of probation. Instead, they might 
spend months or years confined as incompetent.”). 
58. 
59. 
60. Id. 
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arrestees without mental health conditions.61 
These numbers can vary significantly depending on the defendant. Medication 
takes longer to work in some patients than others, and doctors may attempt a se-
ries of medications (each of which can take up to two months to show results) 
before finding one that works.62 And antipsychotics are not a panacea—for about 
twenty percent of patients, they never work.63 
Moreover, defendants rendered competent in a state mental health facility 
often fall back into incompetence when returned to local jails to resume trial 
proceedings. Defendants who have been restored to competence through antipsy-
chotic medication may refuse to continue taking the medication when they 
return to their jail cell, or the jail may not have the same medications available as 
the inpatient facility.64 
See FLA. SENATE BUDGET SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. APPROPRIATIONS, INTERIM 
REPORT ON THE FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, at 3 (2011) (“Reasons for [decompensation] 
include delays in the trial date, differences in the drug formulary between the state treatment facility and 
the jail, the mental fragility of the individual, and disagreements between the court-ordered competency 
evaluation and the forensic hospital’s evaluation.”) [hereinafter FLA. SENATE REPORT]; Michael Braga et 
al., Insane. Invisible. In Danger. ‘Definition of Insanity’: Florida Spends Millions Making Sure the 
Mentally Ill Go To Court—And Gets Nothing for It, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www. 
tampabay.com/projects/2015/investigations/florida-mental-health-hospitals/competency/ [https://perma. 
cc/YH78-HCG7] (“Florida does little to make sure patients who are successfully treated stay competent— 
not even long enough to face their day in court.”); Ben Hattem, How New York’s Mentally Ill Get Lost in 
Courts, Jails and Hospitals, AL JAZEERA AM. (July 27, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/ 
articles/2015/7/27/ny-mentally-ill-get-lost-in-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/NCW2-E2ET] 
(“[P]eople who have attained competency in the state’s mental hospitals frequently decompensate while 
waiting to appear in court, bouncing back and forth between psychiatric facilities and Rikers Island 
sometimes for years without trial.”). 
Psychotic symptoms may quickly return. The result is an 
endless loop of defendants restored to competence, returned for trial, found 
incompetent, and again returned to the system for competence restoration.65 In 
a single year in Florida, for example, 7.8% of defendants restored to compe-
tence and transported to jail pending trial were returned to a competence resto-
ration facility before the trial could begin.66 One man with schizophrenia 
in Texas spent over a year and a half bouncing between jail cells and the state  
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Dora W. Klein, The Costs of Delay: Incompetent Criminal Defendants, Involuntary 
Antipsychotic Medications, and the Question of Who Decides, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 203, 209 
(2013) (“It is a well-documented fact that it is generally not possible to predict how a particular person 
will respond to a particular antipsychotic medication. For treating physicians, this means that finding a 
medication that is effective in alleviating the symptoms of psychosis but does not cause side effects that 
are intolerable is an exercise in trial and error.” (footnote omitted)); Susan A. McMahon, It Doesn’t Pass 
the Sell Test: Focusing on “the Facts of the Individual Case” in Involuntary Medication Inquiries, 50 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 387, 393 (2013) (stating that antipsychotics usually have a partial effect 
immediately, with the full impact of the medication taking place over six to eight weeks). 
63. E.g., William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection for 
Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 946 (1998). 
64. 
65. See Braga et al., supra note 64; Hattem, supra note 64. 
66. FLA. SENATE REPORT, supra note 64, at 3 (assessing statistics for competence restoration 
recidivism in fiscal year 2010–11). 
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mental hospital.67 
Mitch Mitchell, Insane System? Arlington Man Bounces Between Jail, State Hospital, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (May 9, 2016, 4:23 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/ 
community/arlington/article76594692.html [https://perma.cc/4RRR-CMKJ]. 
Notably, this all assumes that the defendant is a willing participant in his com-
petence restoration. When defendants refuse medication at the treatment facility, 
pretrial detentions can extend even longer. It is not uncommon for defendants in 
federal courts to have been detained for well over a year before a court decides a 
motion to medicate.68 For cases that continue on to the appellate courts, the wait 
can be two to three years between indictment and decision on the motion to 
medicate.69 
The case of Herbert Evans provides but one example of the long path between 
indictment, competence restoration, and verdict.70 After being indicted for threat-
ening a government agent in November 2002, he remained in pretrial detention 
for the next four years and was dosed with antipsychotic medication against his 
will.71 In November 2007, a jury acquitted him of all charges.72 
Defendants like Evans who are found incompetent to stand trial will need to 
spend more time in contact with the criminal justice system, simply because they 
go through a competence restoration process that is inapplicable to other defend-
ants. The relevant question, however, is whether the defendant spends that time 
in a state facility or in the community. This Article does not challenge either the 
idea that these defendants should be treated differently or the notion that some 
subset of defendants found incompetent must be restored at an inpatient facility, 
and thus will spend a longer time in pretrial detention. What I instead argue is 
that competence restoration statutes as written send defendants to inpatient facili-
ties on the basis of ambiguous and irrelevant criteria such as “dangerousness” 
rather than on the likelihood that inpatient treatment is necessary to restore com-
petence. As a result, defendants found incompetent may be detained unnecessa-
rily, enduring an involuntary separation from their communities and contributing 
to the backlog for inpatient beds. 
67. 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 2006 WL 1127006, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2006) (indicted 
May 2, 2004; decision issued April 27, 2006); United States v. Horton, 941 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (N.D. 
Ohio 2013) (indicted August 18, 2011; decision issued April 22, 2013); United States v. Banks, 2015 
WL 1932928, at *1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2015) (indicted November 18, 2013; decision issued April 29, 
2015). 
69. See, e.g., United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 414 (4th Cir. 2010) (defendant detained for forty- 
one months); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 694 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant detained for 
over forty-seven months). 
70. See United States v. Evans, 427 F. Supp. 2d 696 (W.D. Va.), aff’d, 199 F. App’x 290 (4th Cir. 
2006). 
71. Evans, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 697, 706; see also White, 620 F.3d at 418 (discussing the forcible 
medication of Evans). 
72. Judgment of Acquittal at 1, United States v. Evans, No. 1:07-cr-00043 (W.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2007). 
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B. DEFENDANTS LIVING WITH MENTAL ILLNESS SUFFER SIGNIFICANT HARMS WHILE 
CONFINED 
Not only is lengthy pretrial detention problematic in its own right, but the jail 
environment is particularly harmful for inmates with mental illness because they 
(1) often deteriorate from a lack of treatment and exposure to a chaotic, violent 
environment; (2) are put in solitary confinement for rule infractions or psychiatric 
monitoring at higher rates than defendants without mental illness; and (3) suffer 
abuse and neglect at higher rates than defendants without mental illness. 
1. Jail Environment and Services 
While in jail, most defendants found incompetent to stand trial do not receive 
any competence restoration services.73 Often, they receive no mental health serv-
ices whatsoever.74 
One study found that only one in six jail inmates with mental illness received treatment after 
admission. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006); see also RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., 
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 12 (2015), 
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-front-door-report. 
pdf (“83 percent of jail inmates with mental illness did not receive mental health care after admission.”). 
Defendants with mental health conditions are known to 
quickly fall apart behind bars without adequate mental health treatment. One 
report on the conditions for detainees living with mental illness in Washington 
state jails found that individuals who had no access to mental health services 
“decompensated to the point of smearing themselves with feces, considering sui-
cide, and experiencing hallucinations and extreme fear.”75 
The environment itself often contributes to the deterioration of these defend-
ants. As one scholar succinctly put it, “[p]risons are places of intense brutality, vi-
olence, and dehumanization.”76 Inmates are tightly controlled and required to 
follow orders backed by force—forced to eat, sleep, and interact with others on 
terms dictated by jailers.77 Rape and violence are common occurrences.78 For an 
individual suffering from mental illness, this setting is “at best, counter-therapeu-
tic and, at worst, dangerous to [an inmate’s] mental and physical well being.”79 
These defendants have fewer resources to deal with the turmoil: “Anxious, 
depressed, psychotic[,] suicidal[,] and homicidal inmates are at increased risk of  
73. See Lakey v. Taylor, 435 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tex. App. 2014) (“[C]ounty jails do not provide 
competency-restoration treatment . . . .”). 
74. 
75. DISABILITY RIGHTS WASH., LOST AND FORGOTTEN: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT WHILE 
WAITING FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND RESTORATION 7 (2013). 
76. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1173 
(2015). 
77. E.g., id. at 1173–74. 
78. See id. at 1204 (explaining that there were approximately 216,000 sexual assaults in U.S. prisons 
in 2008). 
79. Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, a Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons as Facilities for 
the Mentally Ill, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 139 (2006); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 
74, at 12 (“Characterized by constant noise, bright lights, an ever-changing population, and an 
atmosphere of threat and violence, most jails are unlikely to offer any respite for people with mental 
illness.”). 
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deteriorating emotionally and of having impaired judgment in such settings.”80 
2. Solitary Confinement 
Yet the deterioration of a detainee’s mental state may be the least of his con-
cerns. Some defendants with mental health conditions have it far worse. Unable 
to follow the strict rules and regulations of a jail environment, they are punished 
and placed in solitary confinement at much higher rates than the general popula-
tion.81 In Pennsylvania and South Carolina, for example, an inmate82 with a men-
tal health condition is twice as likely to be placed in solitary confinement as an 
inmate without one83
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CALLOUS AND CRUEL: USE OF FORCE AGAINST INMATES WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITIES IN U.S. JAILS AND PRISONS (2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/12/ 
callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mental-disabilities-us-jails-and [https://perma.cc/B36K-XM2W] 
[hereinafter HRW, CALLOUS AND CRUEL]. 
—and those inmates are particularly susceptible to the well- 
known psychological harms of solitary confinement. Even for prisoners with no 
history of mental illness, the conditions of extended solitary confinement “may 
press the outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate.”84 
For prisoners with mental illness, placing them in isolation is akin to “putting 
an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe.”85 As one doctor testified, isolat-
ing prisoners in small cells for twenty-three hours a day intensifies any preexist-
ing mental illness: 
Prisoners who are prone to depression and have had past depressive episodes 
will become very depressed in isolated confinement. People who are prone to 
suicide ideation and attempts will become more suicidal in that setting. People 
who are prone to disorders of mood, either bipolar . . . or depressive[,] will 
become that and will have a breakdown in that direction. And people who are 
psychotic in any way . . . those people will tend to start losing touch with real-
ity because of the lack of feedback and the lack of social interaction and will 
have another breakdown, whichever breakdown they’re prone to.86 
80. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 54 
(2003) (quoting Cheryl D. Wills, The Impact of Conditions of Confinement on the Mental Health of 
Female Inmates Remanded to Alabama Department of Corrections, prepared for Laube v. Haley, No. 
02-T-957-N (M.D. Ala. 2002)) [hereinafter HRW, ILL-EQUIPPED]. 
81. See, e.g., SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 12 (noting that defendants with mental illness 
are more likely to be placed in solitary confinement “either as punishment for breaking rules or for their 
own protection since they are also more likely to be victimized”). 
82. I use the term “inmate” to refer to residents of both jails and prisons in the discussions on solitary 
confinement, abuse, and neglect, as the studies to which I am referring make no distinction between the 
two. 
83. 
84. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding solitary confinement 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for prisoners living with mental illness); see also Reginald 
Dwayne Betts, Only Once I Thought About Suicide, 125 YALE L.J. F. 222, 228 (2016) (describing his 
time in solitary confinement: “Each day, I lost a little bit of what made me want to be free. . . . One 
afternoon, in a fit of panic, I slammed my right fist against the wall. I fractured my pinky. I thought about 
suicide. I almost disappeared.”). 
85. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1265. 
86. HRW, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 80, at 152 (quoting testimony of Dr. Terry Kupers in Jones ’El 
v. Berge, No. 00-C-0421-C (W.D. Wis. 2001)). 
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Predictably, tragedy occurs when individuals with mental illness are placed in 
isolation. Suicide rates are higher among inmates in segregation units than those 
in the general population.87 One inmate mutilated his own genitals while in soli-
tary confinement.88 
Jason M. Breslow, What Does Solitary Confinement Do to Your Mind?, FRONTLINE (Apr. 22, 
2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-does-solitary-confinement-do-to-your-mind/ 
[https://perma.cc/6PFQ-7PGK]. 
Another prisoner in isolation refused food and medication, 
ingested feces, and smeared feces on himself.89 Eleven days after his transfer to 
the segregation cell, he was found lying naked on the floor covered in vomit, 
urine, and feces. He was hypothermic by the time he reached the hospital and 
died after going into cardiac arrest.90 
3. Abuse and Neglect 
Even if an inmate with mental illness avoids solitary confinement, he will still 
be targeted by guards and other inmates.91 Individuals with mental health disor-
ders are twice as likely to be injured in a fight with another inmate.92 Eight per-
cent of male prisoners with a mental illness reported being sexually assaulted, as 
compared to three percent of male prisoners without a mental health disorder.93 
Twenty-three percent of female inmates with a mental health condition have 
reported a sexual assault.94 
Individuals with mental health conditions are not just victims of other inmates, 
but also of the guards charged with their protection. In South Carolina, prison 
guards used force against these inmates at a rate 2.5 times higher than other 
inmates.95 In Colorado, prisoners living with mental illness accounted for three 
percent of the prison population but thirty-six percent of use-of-force incidents.96 
In New York, over the course of eleven months, corrections officers at Rikers 
Island beat 129 inmates so badly that they suffered “serious injuries” beyond the 
capacity of the jail clinic to treat, such as ruptured eardrums, broken jaws, and  
87. See Raymond F. Patterson & Kerry Hughes, Review of Completed Suicides in the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1999 to 2004, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 676, 678 (2008) 
(“We found that the conditions of deprivation in locked units and higher-security housing were a 
common stressor shared by many of the prisoners who committed suicide.”). 
88. 
89. HRW, CALLOUS AND CRUEL, supra note 83. 
90. Id. 
91. See id. (“Experts we consulted for this report said that force is used disproportionately against 
prisoners with mental illness.”). 
92. Seena Fazel et al., Mental Health of Prisoners: Prevalence, Adverse Outcomes, and 
Interventions, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 871, 875 (2016). 
93. Id. 
94. Id.; Annette S. Crisanti & B. Christopher Frueh, Risk of Trauma Exposure Among Persons with 
Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: What Do We Really Know?, 24 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 431, 
433 (2011). These numbers are likely significantly higher, as sexual assault is an underreported crime 
both inside and outside the correctional system. Only twenty-two percent of male and thirty-four percent 
of female inmates report their assaults. See Shannon K. Fowler et al., Would They Officially Report an 
In-Prison Sexual Assault? An Examination of Inmate Perceptions, 90 PRISON J. 220, 221 (2010). 
95. HRW, CALLOUS AND CRUEL, supra note 83. 
96. Id. 
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head trauma.97 
Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets Brutality in Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/nyregion/rikers-study-finds-prisoners- 
injured-by-employees.html [https://nyti.ms/W2jVRi]. 
Most of the inmates at Rikers are pretrial detainees,98 
Michael Schwirtz, What Is Rikers Island?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/04/05/nyregion/rikers-island-prison-new-york.html [https://nyti.ms/2oJAH6O] (“Most of the 
inmates—about 85 percent—have not yet been convicted of a crime; they are pretrial detainees, either 
held on bail or remanded to custody.”). 
and seventy- 
seven percent of the beaten inmates had a diagnosed mental illness.99 Elsewhere, 
one inmate diagnosed with mental illness died after guards sprayed him with 
scalding water.100 
Eyal Press, Madness: In Florida Prisons, Mentally Ill Inmates Have Been Tortured, Driven to 
Suicide, and Killed by Guards, NEW YORKER (May 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2016/05/02/the-torturing-of-mentally-ill-prisoners [https://perma.cc/6287-YSCN]. 
Another tried to commit suicide; rather than taking the prisoner 
for medical care, guards handcuffed him and punched him with such force “that 
he suffered a perforated bowel and needed emergency surgery.”101 A third died 
from asphyxiation after officers restrained him, then allegedly kicked, choked, 
and stomped on him.102 
Detainees with mental illnesses who are not actively abused in prison may suf-
fer from neglect, which can lead to equally tragic outcomes. To take just a few 
examples: Jamycheal Mitchell, the young man from Virginia described at the be-
ginning of this Article, died after languishing in his jail cell for months. Other 
inmates alleged that prison guards had denied Mitchell food, cut off water to his 
cell, and confiscated his bed sheets, mattress, and clothing after Mitchell smeared 
feces on the wall of his cell.103 By the time of his death, he had lost forty 
pounds.104 In Florida, a man with schizophrenia gouged out his eyes while await-
ing hospital admission and treatment.105 On Rikers Island, an inmate in a mental 
health unit died after being found in an overheated jail cell; an officer should 
have been making rounds to check on the inmates but remained in her chair for 
most of her shift.106 
Michael Schwirtz, Correction Dept. Investigating Death of Inmate at Riskers Island, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/nyregion/correction-dept-investigating- 
death-of-inmate-at-rikers.html [https://nyti.ms/1l5cl2j]. 
Since 2010, at least 404 people with a mental health condition have died in 
America’s jails.107 
Gary A. Harki, Horrific Deaths, Brutal Treatment: Mental Illness in America’s Jails, VIRGINIAN- 
PILOT (Aug. 23, 2018), https://pilotonline.com/news/local/projects/jail-crisis/article_5ba8a112-974e-11e8- 
ba17-b734814f14db.html [https://perma.cc/4A7Y-2TE7]. 
The total number is likely much higher, but many states and 
the federal government do not track the mental health status of inmates who die  
97. 
98. 
99. Winerip & Schwirtz, supra note 97. 
100. 
101. Winerip & Schwirtz, supra note 97. 
102. HRW, CALLOUS AND CRUEL, supra note 83. 
103. Complaint at 5–7, Adams v. Naphcare, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (E.D. Va. 2017) (No. 2:16- 
cv-229), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2018). 
104. Id. at 6. 
105. Hal Wortzel et al., Crisis in the Treatment of Incompetence to Proceed to Trial: Harbinger of a 
Systemic Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. & PSYCHIATRY L. 357, 359 (2007). 
106. 
107. 
616 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:601 
while in custody.108 
II. THE STIGMA AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS 
These negative outcomes—longer periods detained and harmful effects of 
detention—result from the large numbers of defendants found incompetent and 
ordered into inpatient treatment. Why do so many incompetence findings end 
with an order for transfer to the state mental health facility? In part, this is due to 
a shortage of community options; only a handful of states operate outpatient treat-
ment centers, and even the most robust outpatient programs only accept a handful 
of defendants.109 
But even if every state immediately opened outpatient facilities that could 
serve large numbers of patients, the statutes governing competence restoration 
would likely continue to default to inpatient care. Some jurisdictions require this 
outcome.110 Other statutes give judges broad discretion on where to place defend-
ants, inviting them to consider questions such as whether the defendant is danger-
ous.111 When paired with the entrenched stigma that surrounds individuals with 
mental health conditions, these statutes, too, lead to inpatient commitment. In the 
next section, I dive into the language of those statutes and show how they lead to 
an inpatient default. Here, I describe the stigma that likely influences decision-
making in this arena. 
Michael Perlin described the misunderstandings of and prejudice toward indi-
viduals with mental health conditions as “sanism,” and identified some of the 
many sanist myths that infect the criminal justice system.112 One of the most 
staunchly held beliefs is that individuals living with mental illness are more dan-
gerous than non-mentally ill individuals.113 A second sanist myth is that defend-
ants found incompetent to stand trial are best treated in a hospital setting.114 
However, neither of these myths accurately reflect the current understanding of 
mental health conditions and individuals living with them. Instead, these assump-
tions are historical remnants from a time when mental illness was poorly under-
stood and greatly feared.115 The following sections attempt to disable the two 
sanist myths that undergird much of the decisionmaking in competence 
108. Id. 
109. See Gowensmith et al., supra note 18, at 299. 
110. See infra Section III.B.1. 
111. See infra Section III.B.2. 
112. See generally Perlin, supra note 24 (identifying “sanism” as an irrational prejudice like sexism 
or racism and explaining its impact on the law). 
113. Id. at 394. 
114. See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 680–81 (1993). 
115. See Perlin, supra note 24, at 388–89 (“The roots of sanism are deep. From the beginning of 
recorded history, mental illness has been inextricably linked to sin, evil, God’s punishment, crime, and 
demons. Evil spirits were commonly relied upon to explain abnormal behavior. The ‘face of madness . . . 
haunts our imagination.’ People with mental illness were considered beasts; a person who lost his 
capacity to reason was seen as having lost his claim ‘to be treated as a human being.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
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restoration: the assumed dangerousness of individuals with mental health condi-
tions and the assumed need for treatment in a mental health facility to success-
fully restore competence. 
A. DANGEROUSNESS 
In a 2013 national survey, “[a]lmost half of respondents believed that people 
with serious mental illness [were] more dangerous than the general popula-
tion.”116 News coverage of mass shootings and other violent acts enhances this 
belief. In one study, individuals who read a news story about a mass shooting 
committed by an individual with mental illness were more likely to believe that 
all people with mental health conditions were dangerous.117 
The policy conversations held in the wake of mass shootings further this 
impression. Conversations about legislation to prevent mass shootings inevitably 
involve restrictions on the ability of people with mental health conditions to 
obtain firearms, regardless of whether the shooter actually suffered from a diag-
nosed serious mental illness. At the time of this writing, the shooting that killed 
seventeen students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida is domi-
nating the news. Almost immediately after the shooting, advocates and legislators 
called for restrictions on the sale of firearms to people with mental health condi-
tions as a way to prevent such shootings in the future. However, there is little indi-
cation that such restrictions would have prevented the shooter himself, who had 
been diagnosed with depression and autism—not a psychotic disorder—from 
buying a firearm.118 
See Susan Ferrechio, Paul Ryan: Congress Should Focus on Mental Health and Background 
Checks, Not Gun Ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/paul- 
ryan-congress-should-focus-on-mental-health-and-background-checks-not-gun-ban/article/2650142 
[https://perma.cc/K97D-JL4U]; Eric Levenson, These Are the Gun Bills Florida Lawmakers Are 
Debating After the Parkland Massacre, CNN (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/ 
politics/fl-bills-guns-parkland-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/NB9J-K8WW]; Phil McCausland, 
Florida Mental Health Agency Examined Cruz in 2016, Didn’t Hospitalize Him, NBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/social-media-post-led-florida-agency-investigate-nikolas- 
cruz-2016-n849221 [https://perma.cc/F68K-4K3U]. 
In addition, perpetrators of mass shootings are assumed to be “mentally ill” 
merely because they committed such an atrocious crime. But if the definition of 
“mental illness” is limited to those who suffer from psychotic symptoms—which 
would exclude individuals who display characteristics of personality disorders, 
such as resentment or entitlement—only twenty-two percent of mass murders 
would qualify as carried out by an individual with mental illness.119 
116. Colleen L. Barry et al., After Newtown—Public Opinion on Gun Policy and Mental Illness, 368 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1077, 1081 (2013). 
117. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: 
Bringing Epidemiologic Research to Policy, 25 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 366, 367 (2015). 
118. 
119. Michael H. Stone, Mass Murder, Mental Illness, and Men, 2 VIOLENCE & GENDER 51, 76 
(2015); see also id. (“[M]ass killers are rarely insane and don’t typically have delusions or the psychotic 
fantasies of the paranoid schizophrenic; instead, they usually have personality disorders—with 
narcissistic and paranoid traits such as entitlement, self-righteousness, and resentment.” (citing 
generally MICHAEL KELLEHER, FLASH POINT: THE AMERICAN MASS MURDERER (1997))). 
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Although links between relatively rare mass murders and mental illness are 
weaker than the public tends to believe, links between mental illness and more 
common violent acts are even more attenuated. Recent studies on the connection 
between mental illness and violence have debunked the myth that people with a 
mental health condition are inherently more dangerous than other people. One 
study of more than one thousand discharged psychiatric patients over the course 
of a year found that patients with mental illness who did not abuse alcohol or 
drugs were no more likely to be violent than their neighbors.120 Another study 
acknowledged that individuals with mental illness were moderately more likely 
to engage in violence than others; however, the study also found that the relation-
ship was significantly attenuated when serious life stressors were considered— 
which indicates that the stressor, rather than the mental illness, may be a more 
significant predictor of violence.121 As one psychiatrist explained: 
It’s time that . . . we begin to knock down stereotypes and start breaking down 
the stigma associated with mental disorders. The first stereotype to go down— 
permanently, we hope—is that people who suffer from depression, anxiety, 
schizophrenia, an eating disorder, or any other type of mental disorder, are 
somehow more violent than others. This simply isn’t true, unless they are 
involved in substance abuse. Use and abuse of substances such as drugs or 
alcohol is often correlated with an increase in violence anyway . . . . 
Violence is most often a criminal activity which has little correlation with a 
person’s mental health. Most people who suffer from a mental disorder are not 
violent—there is no need to fear them.122 
John M. Grohol, Dispelling the Myth of Violence and Mental Illness, PSYCHCENTRAL (June 
1998), http:// psychcentral.com/archives/violence.htm [https://perma.cc/F7JT-DR6N]. 
Of the small number of individuals with a mental health condition who did 
commit violent acts, those with schizophrenia were much less violent than those 
who suffered from major depressive disorder,123 which flies in the face of 
assumptions that individuals living with psychotic symptoms are the most likely 
to act violently.124 In fact, delusions were not associated with violent behavior, 
even if the individual believed someone was out to harm him or was controlling 
his thoughts.125 Individuals rarely harm others because a voice in their head tells 
120. JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL 
DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 33 (2001). The study also noted that the discharged patients were more likely 
to abuse alcohol and drugs than their neighbors. Id. 
121. See Eric Silver & Brent Teasdale, Mental Disorder and Violence: An Examination of Stressful 
Life Events and Impaired Social Support, 52 SOC. PROBS. 62, 72 (2005). 
122. 
123. See Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, 2 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 121, 
122–23 (2003). 
124. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk 
Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 571 (2000) (“Contrary to popular wisdom and to the 
results of several other studies, the data from this study suggest that the presence of delusions does not 
predict higher rates of violence among recently discharged psychiatric patients.”). 
125. Id. 
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them to. Instead, the factors that best predict violence in persons living with men-
tal illness are the same that are thought to predict violence in all humans: being 
young, male, poor, and addicted to drugs or alcohol.126 
If judges hold the same misconceptions as the general public, then they may be 
reluctant to send back into the community individuals who, in their view, are at 
high risk of committing violent crimes.127 In some ways, judges may be even 
more susceptible to the dangerousness myth, as they will likely face public back-
lash if the defendant does turn violent. Although few studies have looked at the 
impact of risk aversion in pretrial release decisions, judges who have released 
defendants only to have them commit crimes have faced significant public criti-
cism.128
See, e.g., Bill Gallo Jr., Murder Suspect Had Been Arrested Earlier on Gun Charge, Then Released, 
NJ.COM (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.nj.com/cumberland/index.ssf/2017/04/murder_suspect_had_been_ 
arrested_on_earlier_gun_ch.html [https://perma.cc/6MV7-K34N] (“The president of the local police 
union believes Black’s release is an example of the failings of the new bail reform law . . . .”); Peter Hermann 
& Keith L. Alexander, D.C. Murder Suspect Freed Until Trial Arrested Again, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-murder-suspect-freed-until-trial-arrested-again/2013/01/ 
30/ca93b574-6b0a-11e2-ada3-d86a4806d5ee_story.html?utm_term=.986004b49fc4 [https://perma. 
cc/W7ZV-8YN9] (quoting the friend of a murder victim allegedly killed by a man on release awaiting trial 
for murder: “Why . . . did the law allow this? Does a life not mean anything?”); Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail 
Reform Algorithm Contribute to This San Francisco Man’s Murder?, NPR (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www. 
npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithm-contribute-to-this-san-francisco-man-s-murder 
[https://perma.cc/GBZ4-KRVR] (quoting the partner of the murder victim about the accused: “I mean, 
he’s violated two probations. He was a convicted felon. And he had a gun charge just five days before 
the murder of Ed French! It’s absolutely crazy. I think the judge has to be held accountable.”). 
 As one D.C. Superior Court judge said, “It’s one of my biggest fears . . . . 
No judge wants to release someone and have that person commit a violent crime 
while on release.”129 
Keith L. Alexander, 11 Defendants on GPS Monitoring Charged with Violent Crimes in Past 
Year in D.C., WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/11-defendants-on- 
gps-monitoring-charged-with-violent-crimes-in-past-year-in-dc/2013/02/09/9237be1e-6c8b-11e2-ada0- 
5ca5fa7ebe79_story.html?utm_term=.89b17a025a99 [https://perma.cc/4EKB-7YNN]. 
B. NECESSITY OF HOSPITALIZATION 
In the past, institutionalization was the only option for individuals suffering 
from severe mental illness. Before the widespread adoption of medications to 
treat mental health conditions, individuals living with schizophrenia or other psy-
chotic disorders would be locked away in a distant institution and subjected to 
wretched conditions.130 Those who were arrested and found incompetent had it 
even worse: they were sent to specialized wards for the criminally insane, which 
126. Stuart, supra note 123, at 123. 
127. The presumption that judges hold these same biases is up for debate. Some studies have shown 
that individuals with legal training hold implicit or explicit biases, but those biases did not affect their 
decisionmaking; other studies showed the opposite. Erik J. Girvan, Wise Restraints?: Learning Legal 
Rules, Not Standards, Reduces the Effects of Stereotypes in Legal Decision-Making, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 31, 31 (2016). 
128. 
129. 
130. E.g., Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance of 
Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1063–64 
(2002). 
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were devoted to warehousing and offered little in the way of treatment.131 As one 
court noted: 
Petitioner testified without contradiction that he had been assaulted by men-
tally deranged persons in shackles. He described noisome, unnatural and vio-
lent acts by inmates in this Hall. . . . 
. . . [T]he facts which petitioner asserts depict a place of confinement for the 
hopeless and the violent, not a place of remedial restriction.132 
In recent decades, a medical breakthrough sparked a move away from institu-
tions and toward community treatment. Antipsychotic medications, the first truly 
effective treatment for psychotic symptoms, became available in the 1950s.133 
The drugs “made the wholesale removal of patients from hospitals imaginable 
and then possible.”134 Since the advent of medication-based treatment, the popu-
lation of state mental institutions has decreased by ninety percent.135 A 1961 
report of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health called the medica-
tions “the greatest blow for patient freedom, in terms of nonrestraint, since Pinel 
struck off the chains of the lunatics in the Paris asylum 168 years ago.”136 
Although this transition to care in the community was not without its signifi-
cant failures, as described in more detail below, it did mark a shift away from 
confinement as the primary mode of psychiatric care. Yet the move away from 
inpatient care did not cross over into the criminal realm. Defendants found 
incompetent continued to be sent to inpatient facilities in large numbers, with lit-
tle consideration of whether the placement was therapeutically desirable.137 
A few possible explanations exist for this discrepancy of community-treatment 
default for civil patients and inpatient default for criminal ones. Judges may 
assume that an individual who is accused of a crime is more in need of inpatient 
care than an individual who has a mental health condition but has not been 
arrested. But there is little data to support that conclusion and much anecdotal 
evidence to contradict it. 
First, the mere fact of arrest bears little relationship to the ability of the defend-
ant to be restored in the community. The criminalization of minor offenses means 
that if you “drive a car, walk, or stand on a sidewalk or public road, you likely 
131. Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 
832, 843 (1960). 
132. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
133. Mossman, supra note 130, at 1062–63. 
134. Id. at 1064 (quoting ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 45–46 (1990)). 
135. Id. at 1065. 
136. Id. (quoting JOINT COMM’N ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
39 (1961)). This is not to say that the history of deinstitutionalization has been a success. But, as noted 
below, the failures of deinstitutionalization are likely due to a lack of funding for community programs. 
See infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. The lesson to be taken from deinstitutionalization policy 
is that inpatient treatment is not always the better solution. 
137. See supra Part I. 
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subject yourself to the legal possibility of arrest.”138 This is particularly true for a 
person living with mental illness, who may be unable to comport himself with the 
societal expectations for behavior in public and may find himself facing a disor-
derly conduct charge, one of the most common charges filed against defendants 
with a mental health condition.139 The simple fact of an arrest may mean little 
more than that the defendant was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and arrest 
alone should have no bearing on whether he could be successfully restored 
through outpatient treatment. 
Second, the success some states have had with preventive outpatient commit-
ment statutes indicates that even individuals with arrest records can be success-
fully treated in the community. These laws allow courts to require an individual 
to submit to treatment in an outpatient setting, even if that individual falls short of 
the criteria for involuntary hospitalization.140 The individuals subject to these 
laws may have had past run-ins with law enforcement, similar to defendants 
found incompetent to stand trial.141 Under the New York statute, for example, 
individuals must have a history of non-compliance with past treatment that has 
resulted in either hospitalization or acts of violence.142 One study showed that 
these patients improved within the first six months of outpatient treatment, notch-
ing substantial increases in social functioning and ability to perform tasks, and 
decreases in incidence of harmful behaviors.143 
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, KENDRA’S LAW: FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF 
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 12–17 (2005), https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/kendra_web/ 
finalreport/aotfinal2005.pdf. 
Court-ordered treatment in the 
community worked for these hard cases and could have similar positive results 
for persons found incompetent. 
Another assumption justifying the inpatient default for criminal defendants 
may be that individuals found incompetent are necessarily the sickest of the sick, 
and the only appropriate venue for restoring their competence is an inpatient fa-
cility. However, this assumption, too, falls apart under scrutiny. 
The competence standard does not measure the severity of mental illness or the 
necessity of inpatient treatment. It looks to whether a defendant is able “to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether 
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.”144 Compare that to the American Psychiatric Association’s standard for 
hospitalization of individuals living with psychotic symptoms, which provides 
that a person requires inpatient treatment only when he is “so severely 
138. Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1157, 1162–63 (2004). 
139. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS 
AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 46 (1992). 
140. See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, Perspectives on Outpatient Commitment, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 
60 & n.115 (2014). 
141. Id. at 55–56. 
142. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c)(4) (McKinney 2015). 
143. 
144. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
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disorganized or under the influence of delusions or hallucinations that [he is] 
unable to care for [himself] and need[s] constant supervision or support.”145 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 54 (2d ed. 2010), https://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/practice_guidelines/ 
guidelines/schizophrenia.pdf. 
The Venn diagram of these two standards may overlap, but the standards are 
not coextensive. For example, some defendants found incompetent have been 
diagnosed with delusional disorder.146 The main symptom is a persistent delusion, 
but the individual’s functioning is not otherwise impaired.147 If a defendant holds 
a delusion that the CIA is pursuing her, she may view her arrest and prosecution 
through the lens of that delusion, thus making her unable to understand the pro-
ceedings against her in a rational way. Yet her functioning in general is not 
impaired, so she could care for herself and does not need constant supervision. 
She is incompetent, yet does not require hospitalization. 
Judges may also believe inpatient care is the best option because of the sordid 
history of deinstitutionalization. But here, too, the fear is not grounded in reality. 
The master narrative of deinstitutionalization is one of unmitigated disaster.148 
Deinstitutionalization reforms, enacted in the 1980s and enabled by the advent of 
antipsychotic medications, moved individuals living with mental illness out of 
asylums and into the community.149 The promise of community-based treatment 
and support for these individuals did not become reality, and an enormous 
increase in homelessness among those with mental illness was laid at the feet of 
the policy.150 Critics of deinstitutionalization have denounced it as “one of the 
era’s most stunning public policy failures.”151 Thus, it may be that judges, who 
see many of these homeless individuals in their courtrooms, are concerned about 
creating a parallel “deinstitutionalization” of the criminal system and adding to 
the ongoing problem. They also could be motivated by a benevolent urge to 
ensure treatment for defendants living with mental illness who may have fallen 
through the deinstitutionalization cracks.152 
However, the historical record is more complex: some argue that it was cuts 
to social welfare programs in the 1980s, not deinstitutionalization itself, that 
caused skyrocketing rates of homelessness among those living with mental 
145. 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 2009). 
147. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 90– 
91 (5th ed. 2013). 
148. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2012). 
149. Id. 
150. Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 
343, 364. 
151. David Mechanic & David A. Rochefort, Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform, 16 
ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 302 (1990). 
152. One survey of judges found that a majority (53.4%) ordered defendants committed for 
competency evaluations as a “means of ensuring adequate treatment” for individuals with a mental health 
condition who appear in court, even though obtaining treatment is not the purpose of those evaluations. 
Kenneth L. Appelbaum & William H. Fisher,  Judges’ Assumptions About the Appropriateness of Civil 
and Forensic Commitment, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 710, 711 (1997). 
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illness.153 But even assuming the common wisdom about deinstitutionalization 
is true—that it caused a massive crisis of homelessness and suffering among 
those living with mental health conditions—concerns about those failures 
would not justify an inpatient treatment default for defendants found incompe-
tent to stand trial. 
The main reason is that defendants moved from inpatient facilities to commu-
nity treatment must abide by the conditions of their release, unlike patients freed 
from mental institutions during deinstitutionalization.154 Judges would likely 
require that defendants in outpatient care comply with a treatment regimen; 
defendants who did not could be returned to jail. This level of supervision was 
not present during the process of deinstitutionalization. Patients were not required 
to obtain treatment, and many did not.155 Because courts retain significant control 
over a defendant’s treatment success, the prospect of large numbers of defendants 
falling through the cracks is not as likely as it was with unmonitored patients 
post-deinstitutionalization. 
Thus, an outpatient default for defendants found incompetent to stand trial 
would be more akin to the assisted outpatient treatment programs described 
above than to deinstitutionalization. In outpatient treatment programs, defendants 
are under court orders to comply with treatment and check in with the court on a 
regular basis.156 These programs have seen good rates of success, with most 
defendants complying with medication regimes and few defendants rearrested.157 
III. THE LAW OF COMPETENCE 
These sanist myths—that persons living with mental illness are more danger-
ous than other individuals and that hospitalization is nearly always the best course 
for defendants found incompetent to stand trial—are not grounded in fact or evi-
dence. But they often form the backdrop against which a judge makes her deci-
sion on where to place an incompetent defendant for competence restoration, 
pushing her in the direction of inpatient treatment. Meanwhile, statutes governing 
competence restoration do little to counterbalance this instinct, and in many cases 
reinforce it. Some statutes mandate inpatient treatment. Others preference it. Still 
others allow for outpatient care but discourage judges from choosing this option. 
This Part traces the history of confinement for defendants found incompetent 
to stand trial and shows how the language of modern statutes continues to 
153. Bagenstos, supra note 148, at 3–4. 
154. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and 
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 387 (1982) (“[T]he ‘community’ to which many patients are 
released is a large and hostile metropolis, and the ‘treatment’ which they receive is often nothing more 
than a renewable prescription for tranquilizing drugs.”). 
155. Id. at 390 (“Released patients left to fend for themselves may be unable to take advantage of the 
services [including medical care] for which they are eligible because such services are not organized in 
any accessible fashion.”). 
156. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 143, at 10–11. 
157. See id. at 11–17. 
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manifest sanist impulses by explicitly or implicitly defaulting to inpatient 
treatment. 
A. COMPETENCE IN COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The idea that the state could not prosecute an individual who was mentally 
unfit originated with the English requirement that a defendant enter a plea to the 
charges against him. Some defendants remained silent, and the courts began to 
distinguish between those defendants who were “mute of malice” and would thus 
be tortured until they entered a plea, and those “mute by visitation of God,” mean-
ing they were physically incapable of speaking.158 At some point in the seven-
teenth century, English judges recognized that some defendants refused to plead 
because they were “lunatics,” and these defendants were added to the “mute by 
visitation of God” category.159 An individual thought to be a lunatic was put to a 
trial by jury to determine whether he was “absolutely mad.”160 If the jury found 
he was, he was confined to prison, presumably with little of what we would con-
sider mental health treatment, until he could plead to the charge.161 
Thus, the common law competence doctrine evolved out of the recognition 
that an individual with mental illness often could not provide what was required 
of him by trial proceedings. The cure for this was not to release the defendant as a 
hopeless case or as someone who could not be tried, but to hold him in state cus-
tody until he could provide the necessary information. As I illustrate below, that 
default—detaining a defendant until he could participate in the trial process—is a 
thread that continues to run through modern competence restoration practice. 
The prohibition on trying “absolutely mad” defendants carried over from 
England to the United States, and some jurisdictions—including the federal 
government—eventually codified those prohibitions in their statutory schemes.162 
The federal statute became the focus of Dusky v. United States, the first Supreme 
Court case to address the treatment of defendants with mental illness.163 
In this two-paragraph opinion, the Court held that the district court used an 
insufficient standard to find the defendant competent. The lower court had found 
that the defendant was competent because he was “oriented to time and place and 
[had] some recollection of events.”164 However, according to the Supreme Court, 
that finding fell below the federal statutory competence standard, which required 
that a defendant possess a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as 
158. See Winick, Reforming Incompetency, supra note 27, at 574. 
159. Id. 
160. GRP. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 913 (1974). 
161. Id. 
162. For example, the U.S. Congress first enacted legislation laying out procedures and standards for 
mental incompetency in 1949. Act of Sept. 7, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-285, 63 Stat. 686 (1949) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4241). 
163. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
164. Id. 
2019] REFORMING COMPETENCE RESTORATION STATUTES 625 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”165 Although the exact con-
tours of this language were fuzzy at the time (and remain so today), Dusky intro-
duced the idea that simply showing that the defendant had some sense of where 
he was and what had happened was no longer enough. 
Dusky and the cases that followed expounded on the contours of the compe-
tence standard,166 but they did not examine the process of restoring competence 
that followed an incompetence finding. Jackson v. Indiana was the first to assess 
the equal protection and due process implications for a defendant detained while 
undergoing competence restoration treatment.167 In Jackson, the defendant was a 
“mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school child.”168 He 
was arrested for robbery, but was never tried on the charge because his compe-
tence was almost immediately called into question.169 One of the two psychia-
trists who examined him found his prognosis “rather dim”; the other doubted that 
he had sufficient intelligence to ever develop the necessary communication skills 
to be deemed competent to stand trial.170 The court found Jackson incompetent 
and ordered him committed to Indiana’s Department of Mental Health until the 
Department could certify to the court that the defendant was “sane.”171 Nearly 
four years later, Jackson remained in the facility with little hope of ever being 
restored to competence and with no prospect of release.172 For all intents and pur-
poses, he had been given a life sentence without ever being convicted of a crime. 
The Supreme Court held that Jackson’s indefinite commitment violated his 
rights to due process and equal protection.173 When competence restoration is 
unlikely or impossible, justification for the detention must shift to some other 
basis—dangerousness to self or others, for example—to be constitutionally via-
ble.174 A defendant found incompetent therefore “cannot be held more than the 
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 
probability” he will attain competence in the “foreseeable future.”175 Due process 
requires, at minimum, that the “nature and duration of commitment bear some  
165. Id. 
166. The cases that followed Dusky firmly grounded the competence standard not in federal statutory 
text but in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Pate v. Robinson established this concept, 
holding that trying a defendant found incompetent violated his constitutional fair trial rights. 383 U.S. 
375, 385–86 (1966). A court must therefore hold a hearing whenever evidence raises a “bona fide doubt” 
as to the defendant’s competence. Id. at 385. Drope v. Missouri reiterated the Pate due process standard, 
explicitly recognizing a trial judge’s constitutional obligations to resolve competency issues and to be 
alert before and during trial to evidence suggesting possible incompetence of a defendant. 420 U.S. 162, 
181 (1975). 
167. 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972). 
168. Id. at 717. 
169. See id. 
170. Id. at 719. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 738–39. 
173. Id. at 730–31. 
174. Id. at 736–38. 
175. Id. at 738. 
626 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:601 
reasonable relation” to its purpose of restoring a defendant’s competence.176 
But Jackson gave no guidance as to when, exactly, a pretrial commitment for 
competence restoration exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. And it did not 
question the default position that commitment to an inpatient mental health facil-
ity was necessary for competence restoration. 
B. COMPETENCE RESTORATION STATUTES 
Nearly every state has a statute or court rule governing competence 
restoration,177 and most of these laws default to inpatient treatment.178 
A substantial minority of jurisdictions mandate that defendants found 
incompetent to stand trial must be sent to an inpatient facility, with no 
consideration of the individual circumstances of the case.179 These  
176. Id. 
177. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.110(a) (West 2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4512(A) 
(2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(a)(1) (West 2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(a)(1)(B) (West 2018); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8.5-111(2) (West 2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d (West 2016); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 24-531.05 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7- 
130(c) (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406(1) (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(2) 
(West 2000); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-17(a)–(b) (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-1(b) 
(West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.6 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3303(1) (West 2018); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(1) (West 2005); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648 (2017); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D(5) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(b) (West 2018); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(a) (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2032(3) (West 2018); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(9) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(2) (West 2007); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-1823(1) (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.425(1) (West 2017); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 135:17-a (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(b) (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.2 
(1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.40(1) (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1002(a)(2) 
(West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-04-08 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38(B) 
(West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.7 (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.370(2) (West 
2018); 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 7403 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40.1-5.3-3(i) 
(West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-430 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-4 (1999); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 33-7-301 (West 2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.072 (West 2017); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-15-6 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.2 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§10.77.086 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.14(5) 
(West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(g) (West 2010); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 11.6(c); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.212(c); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01(6); MISS. R. CRIM. P. 12.5(d). In Vermont, criminal courts have the 
ability to commit a defendant who qualifies as “a person in need of treatment,” meaning an individual 
who poses a danger to himself or others, but that power is not directly connected to a finding of 
incompetence as it is in other states. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(a) (West 2014). 
The federal government also has a statute governing treatment of incompetent defendants, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4241 (2012), although the number of individuals impacted by the federal law is vastly less than those 
governed by the state statutes. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (“In our federal 
system the administration of criminal justice is predominantly committed to the care of the States. . . . 
Broadly speaking, crimes in the United States are what the laws of the individual States make them . . . . ”); 
Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual 
Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 319, 
326–27 (2011) (stating that “although federal criminal law is expanding, criminal justice remains the 
responsibility of states and localities predominately” and that “87.5% of inmates are confined in state 
prisons”). 
178. See infra Sections III.B.1–2. 
179. See infra Section III.B.1. 
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statutes180 are the most problematic of the lot because they mandate commitment 
regardless of individual circumstances. 
But problems abound even in those states that allow judges to use their discre-
tion to determine the appropriate placement for a defendant found incompe-
tent.181 The standards for determining whether the defendant should be in 
inpatient treatment are often uncertain and thus ripe for the importation of sanist 
assumptions about individuals living with mental illness.182 Moreover, the incom-
petence commitment standards are often not linked to the pretrial release criteria 
in the statutory code, and defendants with mental health conditions thus face a 
release inquiry that is different—and often harsher—than that faced by their non- 
mentally ill counterparts.183 
Although no two competence restoration statutes are identical, many exhibit 
some problematic commonalities, which I describe below. 
1. Required Inpatient Statutes 
Nine jurisdictions (the federal government and eight states) require courts to 
hospitalize defendants found incompetent.184 Three additional states mandate  
180. I am using the term statute for simplicity’s sake, but provisions in some states are set out in the 
state’s court rules rather than the statutory code. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 11.6(c); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.212(c); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01(6); MISS. R. CRIM. P. 12.5(d). 
181. See infra Section III.B.2. 
182. See infra Section III.B.2. 
183. See infra Section III.B.2.b. 
184. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (“If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings 
against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the 
Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable 
facility . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(2) (“[T]he court shall commit him to the custody of the 
director of the department of health and welfare, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, for care 
and treatment at an appropriate facility of the department of health and welfare or if the defendant is 
found to be dangerously mentally ill as defined in section 66-1305, Idaho Code, to the department of 
correction for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3303(1) (“[T]he court 
shall order the defendant to remain in an appropriate state, county, private institution or facility until the 
defendant attains competency to stand trial . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(1) (“If the court 
finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial but there is a substantial probability he will attain 
competency in the foreseeable future, it shall commit the defendant to a treatment facility or a forensic 
psychiatric facility . . . .”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(9) (“If the court determines that the accused lacks 
mental fitness to proceed, the criminal proceedings shall be suspended and the court shall commit him to 
the director of the department of mental health.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(2)(a) (“If the court 
determines that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed, the proceeding against the defendant must be 
suspended, . . . and the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the director of the department 
of public health and human services to be placed in an appropriate mental health facility . . . or 
residential facility . . . of the department of public health and human services for so long as the unfitness 
endures or until disposition of the defendant is made pursuant to this section, whichever occurs first.”); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1823(1) (“Should the judge determine after a hearing that the accused is 
mentally incompetent to stand trial and that there is a substantial probability that the accused will 
become competent within the foreseeable future, the district judge shall order the accused to be 
committed to a state hospital for the mentally ill or some other appropriate state-owned or state-operated 
facility for appropriate treatment until such time as the disability may be removed.”); S.C. CODE ANN. 
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commitment when the defendant is accused of a felony.185 
Nebraska is typical of a mandatory-commitment statute: if a judge determines 
a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, she “shall order the accused to be com-
mitted to a state hospital for the mentally ill or some other appropriate state- 
owned or state-operated facility.”186 Under this statute, a judge in Nebraska has 
no ability to release the defendant and place him in outpatient care, even if the de-
fendant is not dangerous, poses no flight risk, and would benefit from treatment in 
the community. 
The federal statute is similar, stating that the court “shall commit the defendant 
to the custody of the Attorney General” to “hospitalize the defendant for treat-
ment in a suitable facility.”187 District courts have no option but to commit 
defendants, regardless of their potential for successful treatment in the commu-
nity. One court held that a defendant who was not dangerous and stood little 
chance of having his competence restored was required to be committed to a 
mental health facility under this statute.188 Another court acknowledged that out-
patient treatment was “best for all concerned,” and even stated that inpatient 
treatment risked “permanent harm” to the defendant, but ordered him into the 
custody of the Attorney General regardless.189 
Jurisdictions with mandatory-commitment statutes are declining in number, 
and several states (along with the District of Columbia) have changed their 
§ 44-23-430 (“If . . . the court finds that . . . the person is unfit to stand trial but likely to become fit in the 
foreseeable future, the court shall order him hospitalized up to an additional sixty days.”); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-10A-4 (“[T]he court shall commit the defendant to the custody of an approved facility 
having residential capability.”). 
185. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.110(a) (mandating that courts “shall commit” defendants accused 
of felonies to the state department of mental health, but “may commit” defendants charged with other 
crimes); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130(c)(3) (instructing that if “there is a substantial possibility” a 
defendant will attain competence, the state mental health department “shall retain custody over the 
accused,” but if the accused is charged with a misdemeanor or nonviolent offense, “the court . . . may, in 
its discretion, allow continued treatment to be done on an outpatient basis”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 648(A)(1) (“[I]f the person is not charged with a felony . . . the court may order outpatient care 
and treatment . . . .”). I count these states in this tally because partially inpatient-required statutes suffer 
from some of the same deficits as the fully mandatory inpatient jurisdictions above: a defendant charged 
with a felony crime may not be dangerous, pose a flight risk, or require inpatient care to ensure 
compliance with a medication regime. Nevertheless, they are placed in the most restrictive environment 
by default. 
186. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1823(1) (emphasis added). 
187. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (emphasis added). 
188. See United States v. Shawar, 865 F.2d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The plain meaning of this 
phrase is, and we hold it to be, that once a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, a district judge 
has no discretion in whether or not to commit him.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 
761 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A]fter determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is 
required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General . . . .”); United States v. Filippi, 
211 F.3d 649, 652 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he statute is categorical in determining who shall be incarcerated 
. . . .”); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]his statute is mandatory 
and . . . the district court [does] not have the authority to circumvent the hospitalization.”). 
189. United States v. Sherman, 722 F. Supp. 504, 505–06 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that the court had 
no power to order the defendant’s placement, but recommending that the Attorney General consider the 
phrase “hospitalize in a suitable facility” to mean a placement that would give the defendant the 
treatment he needed to become competent: outpatient care). 
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statutes from inpatient-required to inpatient-discretionary in recent years.190 In 
1972, thirty-two states mandated inpatient treatment upon a finding of incompe-
tence,191 compared to only nine jurisdictions today (twelve, including those states 
that mandate inpatient treatment for felony defendants). And these statutes stand 
on the weakest constitutional grounds. Indeed, during the editing of this Article, 
the Georgia Supreme Court held that its statute, which mandated commitment of 
defendants found incompetent and accused of felonies or violent crimes, was 
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant because it did not consider his indi-
vidual circumstances.192 
Yet mandatory-commitment statutes remain in effect in twelve states—over 
twenty percent of jurisdictions—and are the kind of statutes most in need of 
amendment to allow for outpatient restoration programs. 
2. Discretionary Inpatient Statutes 
However, even those states that have moved to a discretionary inpatient com-
mitment regime—with statutes that say a court “may” commit a defendant rather 
than “shall” commit him—have not much moved the needle on placing defend-
ants in outpatient programs. Many courts still default to inpatient treatment, even 
if the statute does not mandate that result.193 One survey of state mental health 
directors found that outpatient treatment is rarely used, even in states with an out-
patient option.194 
At least part of the reason for this problem is the lack of state-run outpatient 
programs for criminal defendants. For example, Washington allows for outpatient 
treatment in its competence restoration statute.195 But the state has no formal out-
patient program, and competency restoration occurs only in the state’s two foren-
sic hospitals.196 Of the forty-two states that allow for outpatient competence 
restoration, twenty-three have no state-run outpatient restoration program for 
190. For example, D.C. amended its statute in 2004 to allow for treatment in either an inpatient or 
outpatient setting. See Incompetent Defendants Criminal Commitment Act of 2004, 52 D.C. Reg. 2015, 
§ 105 (May 24, 2005). 
191. Robert D. Miller, Hospitalization of Criminal Defendants for Evaluation of Competence to 
Stand Trial or for Restoration of Competence: Clinical and Legal Issues, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 369, 381 
(2003). 
192. McGouirk v. State, 815 S.E.2d 825, 828 (Ga. 2018) (“Neither the crime of which a defendant is 
accused—a crime of which he must constitutionally be presumed innocent—nor the finding of 
incompetency to stand trial is itself a sufficient ground to detain a citizen.” (quoting Carr v. State, 815 
S.E.2d 903, 915 (Ga. 2018))). 
193. See Gowensmith et al., supra note 18, at 295 (“Competency restoration typically occurs in state 
hospitals.”). 
194. Miller, supra note 191, at 384 (“Despite the availability of outpatient treatment, few states 
utilize it very often. Eight directors reported that they did not know how frequent outpatient treatment 
was; 16 reported that no outpatient treatment is done. Eleven directors reported that 5% or fewer 
restorations were done on an outpatient basis, and only three directors reported more than 5%.”). 
195. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §10.77.086 (West 2015). 
196. WA REPORT, supra note 18, at 26 (“Competency restoration appears to begin and end at the two 
state hospitals.”). 
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criminal defendants.197 In those states, outpatient competence restoration is avail-
able in theory, but usually not in practice. 
Yet even if all states suddenly adopted robust outpatient competence restora-
tion programs, most inpatient-discretionary statutes would still be in dire need of 
amendment because the criteria for outpatient treatment are either nonexistent or 
uncertain and irrelevant. When dealing with a stigmatized population such as 
individuals with mental illness, nebulous standards allow judges to import biases 
and misunderstandings, which often results in commitment to inpatient facilities. 
I outline this problem in the statutes described below, which fall into one of 
two categories: (a) no guidance for when outpatient treatment would be appropri-
ate, or (b) ineffective criteria for assessing which defendants qualify for outpa-
tient care. 
a. No Guidance on Placement of Defendant 
A minority of inpatient-discretionary statutes provide no criteria whatsoever 
on the placement of the defendant for treatment. Such language is an improve-
ment over the mandatory-commitment statutes because it allows for outpatient 
treatment, but the lack of guidance as to which placement is appropriate allows 
sanist biases to drive judicial decisionmaking. Delaware, for example, mentions 
no outpatient option at all, stating only that courts “may order” the defendant to a 
state facility to be confined and treated.198 The use of “may” rather than “shall” 
indicates that the door is open to alternatives, such as placement in the commu-
nity. But the default remains inpatient treatment, and there is little indication that 
courts in Delaware will order competence restoration in any setting other than a 
state hospital. 
Most inpatient-discretionary statutes are more explicit; they go beyond simply 
stating that a court “may” place a defendant in inpatient care and explicitly note 
that defendants can be treated in the community. But several states simply make 
both inpatient and outpatient options available to the judge, and provide no guid-
ance as to which defendants require each type of treatment.199 
197. See supra note 18. 
198. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (West 2012) (“[T]the court may order the accused person to be 
confined and treated in the Delaware Psychiatric Center until the accused person is capable of standing 
trial.”); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.40(1) (McKinney 2013) (“[S]uch court must issue a 
temporary order of observation committing him or her to the custody of the commissioner for care and 
treatment in an appropriate institution or, upon the consent of the district attorney, committing him or 
her to the custody of the commissioner for care and treatment on an out-patient basis . . . .”); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 12.1-04-08(2) (West 2013) (“The court may at any time make a referral for other 
appropriate services, treatment, or civil commitment.”). 
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d (West 
2016) (“[T]he court shall order the placement, on either an inpatient or an outpatient basis, which the 
court finds is the least restrictive placement appropriate and available to restore competency.”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-7-130(c)(3) (West 2017) (“[I]f the accused is charged with a misdemeanor offense or a 
nonviolent offense, the court shall retain jurisdiction over the accused but may, in its discretion, allow 
continued treatment to be done on an outpatient basis by the department.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/104-17(b) (West 2018) (“If the defendant’s disability is mental, the court may order him placed for 
treatment in the custody of the Department of Human Services, or the court may order him placed in the 
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California provides one example of this type of statute. The court must “order 
that the mentally incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State 
Department of State Hospitals facility, . . . or to any other available public or pri-
vate treatment facility, . . . or placed on outpatient status.”200 It then carves out 
categories for accused sex offenders and those accused of “violent felonies,” and 
requires they be placed in inpatient care unless the defendant would not pose a 
health and safety risk to others.201 But for defendants who fall outside those cate-
gories, guidance is in short supply. The only requirement is that the “community 
program director” evaluate the defendant and recommend inpatient or outpatient 
treatment.202 The statute itself provides no criteria for placement. 
Virginia follows a similar course: 
[T]he court shall order that the defendant receive treatment to restore his com-
petency on an outpatient basis or, if the court specifically finds that the defend-
ant requires inpatient hospital treatment, at a hospital designated by the 
Commissioner of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services as appropri-
ate for treatment of persons under criminal charge.203 
This statute is one of the few that default to outpatient treatment, which is an 
improvement over those of many states. But the statute leaves unsaid what factors 
would be considered for the specific finding that the defendant requires inpatient 
care. 
The eight other states that fall into this category—Connecticut, Georgia, 
Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia—use a 
custody of any other appropriate public or private mental health facility or treatment program which has 
agreed to provide treatment to the defendant.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-D (2016) (“[T]he 
court . . . may either . . . [c]ommit the defendant to the custody of the Commissioner of Health and 
Human Services for placement in an appropriate program for observation, care and treatment of people 
with mental illness . . . [which] may be in an institution for the care and treatment of people with mental 
illness, . . . an intensive outpatient treatment program or any program specifically approved by the 
court.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.7(B) (West 2015) (“The proposed treatment may be either 
inpatient or outpatient care depending on the facilities and resources available to the court and the type 
of disability sought to be corrected by the court’s order.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.2 (West 2017) 
(“[T]he court shall order that the defendant receive treatment . . . on an outpatient basis or, if the court 
specifically finds that the defendant requires inpatient hospital treatment, at a hospital . . . .”); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §10.77.086 (West 2015) (“[T]he court: (A) Shall commit the defendant to the custody 
of the secretary who shall place such defendant in an appropriate facility of the department for 
evaluation and treatment; or (B) May alternatively order the defendant to undergo evaluation and 
treatment at some other facility or provider as determined by the department . . . .”); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-6A-3(f) (West 2007) (“If at any point in the proceedings the defendant is found not competent to 
stand trial and is found substantially likely to attain competency, the court of record shall . . . make 
further findings as to whether the defendant requires, in order to attain competency, inpatient 
management in a mental health facility.”); MISS. R. CRIM. P. 12.5(d) (“If the court finds that the 
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, then the court may commit the defendant to the Mississippi State 
Hospital, other appropriate mental health facility, or other place of treatment, either inpatient or 
outpatient . . . .”). 
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(a)(1)(B)(i). 
201. Id. § 1370(a)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii), (a)(1)(F). 
202. Id. § 1370(a)(2)(A). 
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.2(A). 
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hodgepodge of language.204 Yet none guide or restrain a court deciding the place-
ment of a defendant found incompetent. This anything-goes approach inevitably 
allows sanist bias to infiltrate decisionmaking.205 
b. Ineffective Criteria for Placement of Defendant 
Most inpatient-discretionary states do provide some criteria for categorizing a 
defendant as inpatient or outpatient.206 But these criteria often ask courts to place 
a defendant on the basis of her “dangerousness,”207 an assessment that usually 
sets a higher bar for the release of a defendant found incompetent than the criteria 
that apply to competent defendants. For example, a court in Arkansas “may” 
release the incompetent defendant “if the court is satisfied the defendant may be 
released without danger to himself or herself or to the person or property of 
another.”208 A Maryland court may set bail for the same defendant when it finds 
he “is not dangerous . . . to self or the person or property of others.”209 
One problem with this language: pretrial release statutes in these states also 
assess the risk to public safety posed by a particular competent defendant. Yet 
none of these statutes include language requiring a court to find a competent  
204. See supra note 199. 
205. See supra Part II. 
206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4512(D) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(a)(1)(B) (West 2017); 
D.C. CODE § 24-531.05(a) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406(1) (West 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 
35-36-3-1(b) (West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.6 (West 2014); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648 
(2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2032(3) 
(West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.425 (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(b) (West 1999); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.2 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38(B)(1)(b) (West 2016); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 161.370(2) (West 2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40.1-5.3-3(i) (West 2012); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 33-7-301(b)(5) (West 2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.072 (West 2017); ALA. R. 
CRIM. P. 11.6; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.212(c)(3). 
207. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(a)(1)(B); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406(1) (“If the court is 
satisfied that the defendant may be released on conditions without danger to the defendant or to another or 
risk of substantial danger to property of others, the court shall order the defendant’s release . . . .”); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 812.6(1) (“If the court finds the defendant does not pose a danger to the public peace and 
safety, is otherwise qualified for pretrial release, and is willing to cooperate with treatment, the court shall 
order, as a condition of pretrial release, that the defendant obtain mental health treatment designed to 
restore the defendant to competency.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648(A)(1) (“[I]f the person . . . is 
considered by the court to be unlikely to commit crimes of violence, then the court may order outpatient 
care and treatment . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.425(3) (“If 
the court finds the defendant incompetent but not dangerous to himself or herself or to society, . . . the 
judge shall order the defendant to report to the Administrator or the Administrator’s designee as an 
outpatient for treatment . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(b) (“[T]he court may commit him to the custody 
of the Commissioner of Human Services to be placed in an appropriate institution if it is found that the 
defendant is so dangerous to himself or others as to require institutionalization, or it shall proceed to 
determine whether placement in an out-patient setting or release is appropriate . . . .”); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 46B.072(a-1)(1), (2) (“[I]f the court determines that a defendant . . . is not a danger to 
others and may be safely treated on an outpatient basis . . . the court . . . may release on bail a defendant 
found incompetent to stand trial with respect to an offense punishable as a felony . . . and . . . shall release 
on bail a defendant found incompetent to stand trial with respect to an offense punishable as a Class A 
misdemeanor . . . .”). 
208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(a)(1)(B). 
209. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(a). 
2019] REFORMING COMPETENCE RESTORATION STATUTES 633 
defendant is “not dangerous” before release.210 Thus, in these states, the hurdle 
for pretrial release is significantly higher to mount for defendants found incompe-
tent than for competent defendants. 
Several of these states do not mention dangerousness at all in their pretrial 
release statutes, instead using proxies to assess the likelihood a defendant will 
appear for court hearings or commit a crime while released.211 Arkansas is one 
such state. Judges there must look to the defendant’s employment status, prior 
criminal record, and the nature of the current charge, among other criteria, when 
making their pretrial release decisions.212 Nowhere is the defendant’s general 
“dangerousness” mentioned; only a defendant found incompetent must meet that 
nebulous standard. 
Other states do explicitly assess the defendant’s “dangerousness” in their pre-
trial release statutes.213 Yet even in these states, defendants found incompetent 
must often clear a higher bar than all other defendants. Courts in Hawaii, for 
example, can deny bail if they find there “is a serious risk that the person poses a 
danger to any person or the community.”214 But they only apply this criteria if the 
defendant is accused of a “serious crime,”215 meaning any crime with a penalty of 
five years or more.216 Defendants not accused of serious crimes are presumptively 
bailable.217 Jamycheal Mitchell, the defendant who stole a Mountain Dew and 
allegedly starved in his jail cell,218 would have been eligible for release under this 
standard. 
The Hawaii pretrial release statute is easier to satisfy than the competence res-
toration statute in a second way: it does not require courts to find an absence of 
danger. Under the pretrial release language, courts must find that a defendant 
poses a “serious risk” of danger to any person or the community.219 Under 
the competence restoration statute, the court must satisfy itself that “the defend-
ant may be released on conditions without danger to the defendant or to 
another.”220 For Jamycheal Mitchell to be released under this standard, the court 
would have had to find the negative—his lack of dangerousness. Defendants  
210. See ALA. CODE §§ 15-13-3, -4 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 804-3 (West 2018); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 811.1 (West 2013); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 313, 316 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 5-101 (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 178.484, .4851, .4853 (West 2017); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03 (West 2017); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5. 
211. ALA. CODE §§ 15-13-3, -4; IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.1; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-101; 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5. 
212. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b). 
213. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 804-3; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 313, 316; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 178.484, .4851, .4853. 
214. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 804-3(b)(3). 
215. Id. § 804-3(a), (b). 
216. Id. § 706-660. 
217. Id. § 804-3(b). 
218. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
219. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 804-3(b). 
220. Id. § 704-406(1). 
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found incompetent thus have a tougher row to hoe before they are released.221 
In addition, the “dangerousness” criterion is nebulous, which allows for the 
import of bias. Indeed, criteria like “dangerousness” are problematic not only 
because they impose a higher standard than pretrial release statutes, but also 
because they inject uncertainty into competence restoration statutes. There is lit-
tle agreement among courts and mental health professionals as to what qualifies a 
person as dangerous. Any assessment of dangerousness must look to the magni-
tude of the harm (Does the defendant pose a risk of murdering another? Punching 
another? Threatening another?) as well as the likelihood that the danger will 
actually occur (Is it certain that this harm will occur? Will it only happen if the 
defendant is under stress or comes in contact with a certain person? Will it happen 
immediately? In three months? In two years?).222 Most courts have not tackled 
these questions.223 
Moreover, uncertainty abounds when courts or psychiatrists attempt to predict 
the future—and the dangerousness predictions of mental health professionals are 
notoriously unreliable. Studies have found that expert testimony that relies on the 
clinical model, that is, a mental health professional assessing the dangerousness 
of an individual witness through “whatever information the individual clinician 
deemed pertinent,” is inaccurate about half the time.224 One review of the litera-
ture found three central facts to be true: “(a) Mental health practitioners inaccur-
ately make future violence predictions, (b) mental health practitioners lack 
training in making violence predictions, and (c) mental health practitioners’ dan-
gerousness predictions are biased by their reliance on a number of cognitive heu-
ristics, which causes them to overestimate rates of future violence.”225 
Judges have recognized that this vast amount of uncertainty gives them enor-
mous discretion on the question of a defendant’s danger. As one jurist noted, his 
decisions on whether an individual posed a threat of harm “were inevitably based  
221. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[P]roving a 
negative is a challenge in any context.”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (“[A]s a 
practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative . . . .”). 
222. See, e.g., William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate 
Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259, 292–93 
(2010). 
223. Id. at 293. 
224. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 283, 291 
(2006) (noting additionally that success rates can only be fairly assessed by comparing the likelihood of 
accurate prediction to chance, and that a fifty percent accuracy rate could be far more accurate than a 
random assignment). 
225. Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on 
Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 267, 280–81 (2001). More 
recent actuarial methodologies have resulted in better predictions of dangerousness, but nowhere near 
perfection. The testimony of a clinician, relying on an interview and assessment of the individual 
patient, is usually only correct about half the time, whereas the actuarial models, which rely on assessing 
the presence of a series of variables, range from around sixty to eighty percent accuracy. This is still a 
rate of false positives twenty percent of the time, at best. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 283–93. 
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upon my personal values and standards.”226 
IV. AN OUTPATIENT COMPETENCE RESTORATION MODEL 
Whether inpatient-required or inpatient-discretionary, competence restoration 
statutes achieve nearly the same end: inpatient commitment in the vast majority 
of cases. This is because many discretionary statutes either provide no guidance 
on competence restoration placement or use criteria like “dangerousness” that im-
plicate a judge’s “personal values and standards.”227 In a system suffused with 
sanism, such untethered decisionmaking will lead to the overcommitment of 
defendants to inpatient facilities. To counterbalance this tendency, a competence 
restoration statute must reduce discretion and restrain a judge. It must become 
more like a rule and less like a standard.228 
Let’s back up to discuss standards and rules,229 and why a rule is a better 
approach when bias is in play. A legal directive is rule-like “when it binds a deci-
sionmaker” to a particular outcome when certain triggering facts are present.230 
One benefit of this form of legal directive is that it constrains arbitrariness, which 
allows for invalid criteria such as bias to seep into a decision.231 
The main drawback to a rule-based approach is that rules can be both over- and 
under-inclusive, thereby not achieving the underlying goal of the rule in all cir-
cumstances.232 For example, a rule may bar individuals under eighteen from vot-
ing under the assumption that younger people do not have the decisionmaking 
prowess to adequately exercise the voting right. But such a rule both bars excep-
tionally mature and thoughtful young people from voting, and also allows excep-
tionally immature and unthoughtful thirty-year-olds to vote. 
Standards, ideally, avoid these errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giv-
ing the decisionmaker more discretion and allowing her to take all relevant fac-
tors into account.233 This flexibility can prevent injustices from occurring—for 
instance, by allowing the exceptionally mature fifteen-year-old to vote. 
Yet standards contain their own problems—most notably, uncertainty of out-
comes and opportunity for decisions to be based on individual bias.234 For 
226. Brooks, supra note 222, at 295 (quoting Judge Sees Lack of Guidelines for Committing Mental 
Patients, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1987, at 1). 
227. Id. 
228. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 62–66 (1992) (presenting arguments why rules might be preferable to standards). 
229. As many scholars have noted, most laws do not fall into a “rules” or “standards” category. 
Instead, most laws sit on the spectrum between rule and standard, with some espousing rule-like 
qualities and others more standard-like. And, over time and through the analogical reasoning deployed 
in many court decisions, one may evolve to look more like the other. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Stages 
of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 377–79 (2003). 
230. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 58. 
231. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1688 (1976). 
232. See Sullivan, supra note 228, at 58. 
233. Id. at 58–59. 
234. Id. at 58 n.236. 
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example, a standards-based approach to voting eligibility would allow any indi-
vidual with sufficient maturity and intellect to vote, rather than rely on an age 
cut-off. But different judges will have vastly different ideas of what sufficient 
maturity and intellect would be. The same person granted voting rights by one 
judge might be denied them by another. Moreover, some judges may believe— 
consciously or not—that any individual who holds radical left-wing or right-wing 
views should not be allowed to vote, even if she exhibits indicators of maturity 
and intellect. A standard like “sufficient maturity and intellect” allows those 
judges to import these partisan leanings into their decisionmaking. 
A stringent rule with well-defined criteria is a more appropriate form of legal 
directive when a decisionmaker’s implicit biases may be the primary drivers of a 
decision.235 As Cass Sunstein has stated: 
[Rules] can also counteract something worse: bias, favoritism, or discrimina-
tion in the minds of people who decide particular cases. In this way, rules are 
associated with impartiality, a notion which is captured in the idea that Justice, 
the goddess, is “blindfolded.” Rules are blind to many features of a case that 
might otherwise be relevant, and that are relevant in some social contexts, or 
to many things on whose relevance people have great difficulty in agreeing— 
religion, social class, good or bad looks, height, and so forth.236 
Add to this list mental illness, one of the most highly stigmatized issues in 
American society.237 A more rule-like competence restoration statute would 
therefore theoretically cabin judicial discretion and prevent judges from incorpo-
rating sanist biases into their decisionmaking. 
This prediction assumes, of course, that rules actually constrain more than 
standards do, which is a hotly debated question beyond the scope of this Article. 
But all agree that, at the very least, the more rule-like a statute is, the more work a 
judge must do to justify reaching a decision contrary to the dictates of the rule.238 
Reasoned consideration is the enemy of unconscious bias,239 and even if a more 
rule-like statute only succeeds in forcing a judge to think about her decisions 
more carefully, reduction in sanist decisionmaking is the likely result. 
What would a more rule-like competence restoration regime look like? 
Two changes are necessary. First, the statute must align with the state’s pretrial 
release statute and not impose higher and more nebulous barriers to release on 
non-treatment-related grounds. Second, the statute must require outpatient care if 
the defendant is eligible for pretrial release, and only allow inpatient care if such 
treatment is necessary for successful competence restoration. 
235. See id. 
236. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 974 (1995) (citation omitted). 
237. See supra Part II. 
238. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 518–19 (1988). 
239. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (“Control of implicit bias requires active, conscious control.”). 
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A. ELIMINATING PRETRIAL RELEASE DISPARITIES 
The first step for effective competence restoration statutes is to pair these 
statutes with their pretrial release counterparts. Surprisingly, few statutes cross- 
reference the incompetence commitment procedure with the pretrial release pro-
cedure. As I illustrated above, this imposes higher and more nebulous criteria on 
defendants found incompetent to stand trial that are inapplicable to other 
defendants. 
This alternate-standard model is problematic in two respects. First, the simple 
fact that it treats defendants found incompetent differently, and that some statutes 
require courts to be extra-double-sure that this defendant is not dangerous, trig-
gers a judge’s sanist impulses. It implies that these defendants are more danger-
ous, are more in need of confinement, and, further, that the presumption of 
release that applies to other defendants does not apply to them. That differential 
treatment, on its own, leads to more inpatient commitments than are necessary. 
Second, in many jurisdictions, the criteria for release of defendants found 
incompetent are far on the standard end of the spectrum, while the criteria for 
other defendants have the features of a rule. And the trend for pretrial release stat-
utes is moving toward more rule-like empirical risk assessments.240 Incorporating 
the pretrial release criteria into the competence restoration statute avoids the 
inequity of holding incompetent defendants before trial on nebulous dangerous-
ness grounds, while assessing and releasing competent defendants using rule-like 
empirical metrics. 
Colorado is an example of a state that has already incorporated the pretrial 
release statute into its competence restoration scheme. Its competence restoration 
statute says that “[i]f the defendant is in custody, the court may release the de-
fendant on bond upon compliance with the standards and procedures for such 
release prescribed by statute and by the Colorado rules of criminal procedure.”241 
The state’s pretrial release statute then adopts as its goals the reasonable assur-
ance of the defendant’s appearance at trial and the safety of any person or the 
community. It requires courts to use, when available, “an empirically developed 
risk assessment instrument designed to improve pretrial release decisions by 
providing to the court information that classifies a person in custody based upon 
predicted level of risk of pretrial failure.”242 As Colorado implements risk assess-
ment instruments to determine pretrial release, defendants found incompetent 
will also benefit from the change.   
240. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 
842 (noting that pretrial risk assessments promise “to make pretrial decision-making less subjective, to 
improve risk prediction, and to alleviate pressure on judges to err on the side of (over)detention”); see 
also id. at 841 (stating that ten percent of jurisdictions have adopted an “empirically-based risk 
assessment tool, and that number continues to rise”). 
241. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8.5-111(2)(a) (West 2017). 
242. Id. § 16-4-103(3)(a)–(b). 
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Few other states explicitly connect pretrial release statutes and incompetence 
statutes.243 The benefit to doing so is that it guarantees the same standards are 
applied to incompetent and competent defendants. It eliminates the prospect of a 
defendant, otherwise eligible for pretrial release, being held in confinement 
because the state mandates inpatient treatment for findings of incompetence. It 
also cabins judicial discretion for those competence restoration statutes where 
release criteria are nonexistent or grounded in standards like “not dangerous.” 
And as rule-like empirical metrics for assessing risk grow more popular and 
become more incorporated into pretrial release decisions in general, incompetent 
defendants reap the benefits of that change, just as competent defendants do.244 
B. IMPOSING CONCRETE CRITERIA FOR INPATIENT TREATMENT 
Although aligning pretrial release statutes with competence restoration statutes 
eliminates differential treatment on the basis of vague criteria such as “danger-
ousness,” an effective competence restoration statute must address one inquiry 
inapplicable to a competent defendant: the likelihood of treatment success in the 
community. A defendant found incompetent, who is otherwise eligible for release 
under the normal pretrial criteria, should be referred for inpatient treatment if evi-
dence shows that outpatient treatment will not work. But here, too, adoption of a 
rule-like statute would curb a judge’s tendency toward inpatient commitment—a 
sanist impulse that treatment in a hospital is almost always the best option—and 
thus would reserve those hospital beds for the defendants who truly need them. 
This aspect of the statute should contain two parts. First, the statute should 
default to outpatient treatment. Starting with the assumption that a defendant will 
be placed in outpatient treatment unless some specific reason justifies inpatient 
care constrains a judge’s ability to commit defendants based on little more than 
intuition. The second part of the statute would provide exceptions detailing when 
inpatient care is necessary. These exceptions must only assess the likelihood of 
treatment success, not dangerousness or safety, as those questions would have al-
ready been determined through the pretrial release assessment. And they must be 
rule-like, which means they provide concrete triggering facts that bind a decision-
maker to respond in a particular way.245 Because the goal is to keep these circum-
stances the exception rather than the rule, they should be narrowly drawn to 
capture only those defendants who either have a demonstrated history of failure 
in community treatment or have some hallmark of being unable to follow a treat-
ment regimen outside of a structured environment. 
A rule that satisfies these goals may look something like this: If a defendant is 
otherwise eligible for pretrial release, he or she will be placed in outpatient treat-
ment to restore his or her competence, except the court may place the defendant 
243. Illinois also connects its competence restoration and pretrial release statutes. See 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/104-17 (West 2018). 
244. See supra note 240, at 841–42. 
245. Sullivan, supra note 228, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker to 
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”). 
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in inpatient care if (1) the defendant is unable to care for himself and is in need of 
constant supervision and support, or (2) the defendant has shown no improvement 
in outpatient care after a period of thirty days. 
Each of these categories captures a specific circumstance under which a de-
fendant would be unlikely to succeed in outpatient care. The first exception 
comes from the American Psychiatric Association’s recommendations for when 
a patient with schizophrenia is so ill that he requires hospitalization.246 The APA 
default is treatment in the community, and inpatient care only becomes appropri-
ate when the psychotic symptoms reach a stage where the patient needs a struc-
tured environment to function.247 
The second exception provides an opt-out if outpatient treatment proves unsuc-
cessful. If the defendant has begun outpatient care and is showing no alleviation 
of symptoms, the court must not be obligated to continue down a path that is not 
working. 
Compare this proposed statute to the American Bar Association’s recently 
adopted Model Standards on competence restoration,248 which make some pro-
gress in this area but still leave much room for judicial discretion. Those stand-
ards prohibit involuntary hospitalization of defendants found incompetent unless 
“no appropriate treatment alternative is available that is less restrictive than 
placement in the facility.”249 The benefit to this approach is that it flips the stat-
utes so they default to outpatient treatment. 
But the criteria the ABA model standard provides for determining when inpa-
tient treatment is appropriate will do little to offset the judicial inclination to com-
mit defendants found incompetent. Under the model standard, judges have little 
guidance on what kind of treatment may be “appropriate.” As illustrated above, 
many judges may default to believing that only inpatient treatment is appropriate 
for those who suffer from psychotic disorders.250 Moreover, the consideration of 
what is “appropriate” is not limited to medical considerations, and a judge may 
mistakenly believe that a defendant is too dangerous to place in the community. 
Even if such a defendant would be released under a usual pretrial assessment, a 
judge could believe that outpatient placement would not be “appropriate.” A stat-
ute that lays out specific, restoration-based reasons for ordering inpatient treat-
ment will be far more successful in curbing overcommitment to inpatient 
facilities. 
C. CRITIQUES OF PROPOSED COMPETENCE RESTORATION REGIME 
As I illustrated above, a strict outpatient default with narrow, treatment-based 
exceptions for hospitalization could substantially curb the judicial tendency to 
commit defendants found incompetent, thus reducing the time that many 
246. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 145, at 54. 
247. Id. 
248. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH (2016). 
249. Id. § 7-4.10(a)(iii)(B). 
250. See supra Part II. 
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defendants spend confined while awaiting trial. Yet some critiques of this pro-
posed law are immediately apparent. I attempt to address those critiques in this 
section. 
1. These Are Not Really Rules 
One possible critique of the proposed statute is that it is not more rule-like at 
all, and simply replaces one set of standards with another. This criticism can be 
applied to both the pairing of pretrial release statutes with competence restoration 
statutes and the specific proposed language of the competence restoration statute. 
But these criticisms require different responses. 
First, if a state’s pretrial release criteria remain uncertain and mostly within a 
judge’s unbridled discretion, the general bias against defendants with mental 
health conditions could still creep into commitment decisions. Some states, for 
example, ask judges to assess the risk a defendant poses to the safety of himself 
or others as part of the decision on whether to release him.251 Judges could there-
fore require inpatient commitment based on sanist assumptions about a defend-
ant’s dangerousness, exactly the outcome the proposed statute aims to eradicate. 
Two responses to this critique are in order. First, states are unequivocally mov-
ing in the direction of empirical risk assessments.252 As that process continues, 
defendants found incompetent to stand trial, like all defendants, will be subject to 
considerations such as whether they own a cell phone and have a job, and the na-
ture of the charge, rather than abstract concepts of danger. Second, even if a state 
retained language such as “dangerousness” in its pretrial release statute, a change 
to pair that statute with the competence restoration framework would, at the very 
least, avoid the specter of courts double-counting dangerousness. By requiring 
courts to find that a defendant is not dangerous as part of the competence restora-
tion calculus, the statute triggers judicial bias in a way that it might not if judges 
looked to that consideration for every defendant. Moreover, requiring courts to 
look to the pretrial release statutes would undoubtedly be an improvement in 
mandatory-commitment jurisdictions, which currently require inpatient treatment 
in all circumstances. 
A further critique takes aim at the value of the risk assessments themselves. 
The proposed statute assumes that risk assessment is a more objective metric that 
will avoid bias, but some scholars have shown that bias may be baked into the 
empirical model as well. Empirical metrics may provide the veneer of objectivity 
without eradicating bias.253 
This criticism is well-taken, but it also misses the point, at least as far as this 
Article goes. Pairing the fortunes of defendants found incompetent and defend-
ants found competent eliminates the possibility of differential treatment on the 
251. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 804-3(b)(3) (West 2018). 
252. See supra note 240, at 841. 
253. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 242–71 (2015); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: 
Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 392–93 (2006). 
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basis of irrelevant factors. True, defendants found incompetent may still risk bias 
from an empirical risk assessment. But there is less space for bias in such an 
assessment than from a competence restoration statute requiring a court to find 
the defendant “not dangerous.” And it is again an improvement over mandatory- 
commitment statutes, which allow no defendant found incompetent to be 
released. Coupling the competence restoration statute and the pretrial release stat-
ute at least eliminates the higher bar for defendants found incompetent, and opens 
the door for future improvements to the metrics, which may also benefit defend-
ants found incompetent. 
The second half of the statute—particularly the exceptions to outpatient 
treatment—is also open to the critique that the exceptions are not pure rules. For 
example, whether an individual is unable to care for himself is open to interpreta-
tion. Yet any rule has standard-like features, and standards often have rule-like 
features; no legal directive is purely one or the other.254 The changes suggested 
here move the statute much further into rule territory than the status quo, thus nar-
rowing the potential for sanist impulses to govern decisionmaking. 
Another potential critique is that the move towards rule-like language risks 
underinclusivity; defendants may be unlikely to be successfully treated in the 
community for reasons other than those listed in the exceptions. In those cases, a 
judge would be unable to order inpatient treatment even if the defendant sorely 
needs it. 
This critique, however, assumes that judges have perfect foresight as to who 
will respond to treatment in the community. They do not.255 A judge’s conviction 
that a defendant without a history of difficulties in treatment will not succeed in 
outpatient care may reflect little more than the sanist biases outlined above. And 
although my proposed statute risks putting an individual who will not comply 
with a treatment protocol into the community, the remedy for such an infraction 
would be to revoke his release and place him in inpatient care. The status quo 
commits to inpatient treatment individuals who could be restored to competence 
in the community, depriving them of their freedom and perhaps harming them 
physically and mentally, with no avenue for correcting that mistake. The harms 
of the current situation seem far higher than any risk of future mistaken 
placement. 
2. No Legislature Would Pass These Amendments 
Another critique is a practical one: that the chance of any legislature passing 
these kinds of amendments is slim. Legislators are not immune to sanist prejudi-
ces and likely fear the same outcome as judges: a released defendant who com-
mits a horrific crime. 
254. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 823, 828–32 (1991) (explaining that rules and standards are theoretical endpoints on a continuum 
rather than sharply distinct categories). 
255. Cf. supra Section II.A (noting the difficulty of predicting the future in dangerousness 
determinations). 
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Yet even if the arguments above are not enough to override a sanist impulse, 
compelling additional reasons exist for legislative action on this front. First, the 
move toward outpatient care would create significant cost savings. A state would 
save thousands of dollars for each patient it is able to move from inpatient facili-
ties to community treatment.256 Second, states are currently under assault from 
lawsuits alleging that these defendants’ constitutional rights are being violated by 
their lengthy stays in jails while awaiting transfer to inpatient facilities.257 And 
they are losing. For example, Washington state is under a court order to decrease 
its wait times to seven days.258 It has failed to do so and paid $12 million in fines 
for noncompliance.259 
Press Release, ACLU Wash., Fines Paid by the State of Washington for Failure to Comply with 
Court Orders Given to Programs That Keep People with Mental Illness Out of Jail (Mar. 22, 2017), https:// 
www.aclu-wa.org/news/fines-paid-state-washington-failure-comply-court-orders-given-programs-keep- 
people-mental [https://perma.cc/3GZS-QLPF]. 
The Georgia Supreme Court recently found its mandatory- 
commitment statute unconstitutional on due process grounds.260 Other lawsuits 
are likely not far behind.261 
The battles over mental health detention are costly, both financially and in 
terms of the state’s public image. These kinds of cases could compel legislatures 
to preemptively require outpatient care before a court order forces them to do it. 
3. There Are Better Alternatives 
This Article has proposed statutory amendments to allow and encourage outpa-
tient treatment of defendants living with mental illness as a new tool to alleviate 
the crisis of overcrowding in forensic facilities and to reduce the number of such 
defendants held in pretrial detention. But it is not the only tool, nor is it the best 
tool in all circumstances. Instead, this option should be seen as one of many lev-
ers a judge could push when faced with a defendant found incompetent who is 
accused of a crime that, in a competent defendant, would likely result in pretrial 
release. 
256. See WA REPORT, supra note 18, at 29. 
257. See, e.g., Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Holding 
incapacitated criminal defendants in jail for weeks or months violates their due process rights because 
the nature and duration of their incarceration bear no reasonable relation to the evaluative and 
restorative purposes for which courts commit those individuals.”); Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 934, 943–44 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (“The lengthy and indefinite periods of incarceration, without 
any legal adjudication of the crime charged, caused by the lack of space at [the state hospital], is not 
related to any legitimate goal, is purposeless and cannot be constitutionally inflicted upon the members 
of the class.”). 
258. Trueblood v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1012 (W.D. Wash. 
2015). 
259. 
260. See McGouirk v. State, 815 S.E.2d 825, 827–28 (Ga. 2018). 
261. The cases that have been filed thus far have mainly been grounded in substantive due process 
arguments. But one scholar has argued that requiring inpatient commitment also violates the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, as interpreted by Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), which required states to 
provide community-based treatment for people with mental disabilities. See Michael L. Perlin, “For the 
Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with 
Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000). 
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The specific options available to police, prosecutors, and judges in criminal 
cases vary by jurisdiction, but every state affords the opportunity to not pursue 
charges against a defendant. In some cases, it might be best to divert the defend-
ant from the criminal justice system altogether. 
For example, several states have instituted special police units trained to deal 
with individuals in a mental health crisis. These units aim to take individuals with 
mental illness for treatment rather than arresting them.262 
See, e.g., Jenny Gold, Mental Health Cops Help Reweave Social Safety Net in San Antonio, 
NPR (Aug. 19, 2014, 3:34 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/08/19/338895262/ 
mental-health-cops-help-reweave-social-safety-net-in-san-antonio [https://perma.cc/KDW8-LDZZ] 
(highlighting the police department’s initiative with “‘smart justice’—basically, diverting people with 
serious mental illness out of jail and into treatment instead”); Stephanie O’Neill, Police and the 
Mentally Ill: LAPD Unit Praised as Model for Nation, 89.3 KPCC (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.scpr. 
org/news/2015/03/09/50245/police-and-the-mentally-ill-lapd-unit-praised-as-m/ [https://perma.cc/57YM- 
V7AH]. 
Yet this strategy is used 
mostly for individuals who would be arrested for misdemeanors like disorderly 
conduct or other low-level crimes;263 defendants accused of more serious crimi-
nal conduct will usually go through the criminal courts. 
Another mechanism growing in popularity is the use of mental health courts. 
Some jurisdictions have seen great success with this kind of alternate system, 
which combines the effectiveness of treatment options with the coercive power 
of the criminal justice system.264 Yet competence is often a prerequisite for 
individuals to be diverted to mental health courts.265 Individuals found incom-
petent may not be eligible for this option and are relegated to the usual criminal 
process. 
These alternatives are helpful for those defendants that fit within the relevant 
criteria. But there will always be some subset of defendants whose alleged 
crimes must be prosecuted through the normal criminal justice channels, and it 
is to this subset of defendants that the proposal made in this Article will be of 
the most help. What is proposed here is not some method of special treatment. 
In fact, it is the opposite: to ensure that the same non-sanist decisionmaking 
that applies to competent defendants also applies to those found incompetent 
to stand trial.   
262. 
263. See, e.g., Stephanie Franz & Randy Borum, Crisis Intervention Teams May Prevent Arrests of 
People with Mental Illnesses, 12 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 265, 266 (2011) (noting that the goal of jail 
diversion programs is to divert “minor offenders” away from incarceration and toward treatment). 
264. See generally Virginia Aldige´ Hiday et al., Effectiveness of a Short-Term Mental Health Court: 
Criminal Recidivism One Year Postexit, 37 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 401 (2013) (studying mental health 
courts in Washington, D.C. and finding that their results—fewer participants were re-arrested in the year 
following treatment than similar defendants processed through traditional criminal court—added to the 
accumulating evidence of the courts’ effectiveness). 
265. See id. at 402 (noting that D.C. mental health court “accepts competent severely mentally ill 
arrestees”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Our current system of inpatient competence restoration is badly broken.266 
Long wait times in jail harm defendants found incompetent, and the mere under-
taking of competence restoration causes significant delays in the ultimate resolu-
tion of a defendant’s case. 
Increased use of outpatient treatment would lessen these effects. First, for 
many individuals, outpatient treatment will be as successful as the inpatient 
model. Second, for those individuals who do not qualify for outpatient treatment, 
moving some defendants out of the inpatient system would free up much-needed 
bed space, thus reducing wait times from their current, torturous lengths. 
To fix this problem, state and federal competence restoration statutes must be 
revised to encourage more outpatient placement. These schemes are deficient in 
three main respects. First, outpatient treatment is not even a statutory option in 
many states. Second, nearly every state with an outpatient option leaves it to 
the discretion of the judge, who “may” place the defendant in outpatient care. 
This discretion often leads to defendants remaining in jail who would otherwise 
benefit from outpatient care. Third, even states that provide guidance for the 
placement of incompetent defendants have labeled ambiguous or irrelevant infor-
mation as determinative. The end result is that some individuals in every state are 
subject to detention, but would be better served in the community. 
Statutory change is thus required in all jurisdictions. Legislatures should 
amend their codes to require judges to release defendants otherwise qualified for 
pretrial release and refer them for outpatient care as a condition of release, unless 
they fit within a narrow exception for inpatient care. Moving to an “outpatient- 
unless” scheme would immediately increase the population of incompetent 
defendants treated through outpatient means, thereby easing the backlog for indi-
viduals who require inpatient care.  
266. See, e.g., Wortzel et al., supra note 105, at 357 (“Physicians, advocates for the mentally ill, 
proponents of constitutional law, legal and correctional authorities, and champions of basic human 
rights recognize the unacceptable situation that has resulted from the [incompetent to proceed] crisis.”). 
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